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EASTON V. STRASSBURGER: JUDICIAL IMPOSITION OF
A DUTY TO INSPECT ON CALIFORNIA REAL
ESTATE BROKERS
I. INTRODUCTION
The transfer of residential property has traditionally involved the
services of a licensed real estate broker' who markets the property, pro-
cures a purchaser, negotiates the purchase contract, arranges the financ-
ing and closes the escrow. The use of a broker to facilitate a real estate
transaction creates a variety of rights and obligations between the broker,
the seller and the purchaser.2 These rights and obligations are primarily
governed by contract law and the law of agency.3
Under general agency principles, an agency relationship is formed
when one individual, the principal, authorizes another to act on his be-
half in business transactions and to exercise a degree of discretion while
so acting.4 This agency creates a fiduciary relationship between the agent
and the principal.5 In a real estate transaction, the broker's fiduciary
obligation requires that he provide the principal with the same degree of
loyalty and service that a trustee provides a beneficiary.6 The broker's
primary duty is to act in the highest good faith toward his principal.7
1. The terms "real estate agent," "real estate broker," and "real estate licensee" are used
interchangeably throughout this Note. Although distinctions between these terms exist, and
are significant in some situations, the distinctions are not relevant in the context of this Note.
In this Note, the term "listing broker" is used to refer to the seller's broker. See CAL.
CIV. CODE § 1086(f) (West Supp. 1985) ("A 'listing agent' is one who has obtained a listing of
property. . . [for] which he or she is authorized by law to act as an agent for compensation.").
The buyer's agent is referred to as the "selling broker" or the "cooperating broker." See
CAL. CIV. CODE § 1086(g) (West Supp. 1985) ("A 'selling agent' is an agent participant in a
multiple listing service who acts in cooperation with a listing agent and who sells, or finds and
obtains a buyer for, the property.").
2. See generally 1 H. MILLER & M. STARR, CURRENT LAW OF CALIFORNIA REAL Es-
TATE (1975 & Supp. 1984) §§ 4:1-4:31 for a discussion of the parties' rights and obligations.
3. Id., § 4:1, at 2.
4. See, e1g., CAL. CIV. CODE § 2295 (West 1954).
5. See, eg., Earle v. Lambert, 205 Cal. App. 2d 452, 456, 23 Cal. Rptr. 79, 82 (1962).
6. See, eg., Batson v. Strehlow, 68 Cal. 2d 662, 674,441 P.2d 101, 109, 68 Cal. Rptr. 589,
597 (1968).
7. Id at 675, 441 P.2d at 110, 68 Cal. Rptr. at 598. See also CAL. CIV. CODE § 2228
(West 1954) (As a trustee, the agent "is bound to act in the highest good faith toward his
beneficiary, and may not obtain any advantage therein over the latter by the slightest misrepre-
sentation, concealment, threat, or adverse pressure of any kind.").
For a more detailed discussion of the duties imposed on the broker under the law of
agency, see infra notes 43-47 and accompanying text.
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In California, a broker's conduct is also governed by statutory
guidelines.8 The real estate statutes impose special requirements upon a
broker which may limit, redefine or supersede common law agency
principles. 9
Depending on the facts of a particular transaction, the broker may
owe duties to either the seller or the purchaser, or both. The duties owed
by the broker to the seller are clearly defined 0 by the law of agency,
statutory real estate law and the contractual obligations arising from the
listing agreement." The broker's failure to adhere to any of these stan-
dards may result in liability to his principal.
Conversely, it has traditionally been difficult to define the duties
which the broker owes to the purchaser. The problem arises in establish-
ing the existence of a broker-purchaser fiduciary relationship. Unlike the
broker-seller relationship, a contractual agreement generally does not ex-
ist from which to establish the agency. Additionally, the broker-seller
agency relationship often prevents the broker from acting for the pur-
chaser's benefit. Rather, the rules governing conflicts of interest and sub-
agency generally require the broker to act solely for the seller. 12
Recognizing that a home may be the single greatest investment of a
purchaser's life, 3 courts have attempted to protect purchasers in spite of
the above mentioned problems. Therefore, even in the absence of a bro-
ker-purchaser agency relationship, California law prohibits the broker
8. See CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE §§ 10,000-11,709 (West 1964 & Supp. 1985).
9. H. MILLER & M. STARR, supra note 2, § 4:1, at 3. For a more detailed discussion of
the California real estate statutes, see infra notes 48-50 and accompanying text.
10. See Comment, A Reexamination of the Real Estate Broker-Buyer-Seller Relationship,
18 WAYNE L. REv. 1343 (1972).
11. See Romero, Theories of Real Estate Broker Liability: Arizona's Emerging Malpractice
Doctrine, 20 Asuz. L. REv. 767, 769 (1978) ("Where the principal is the seller, the agency
relationship is usually established by the listing agreement.").
For a more detailed discussion of the duties owed by broker to seller, see infra notes 40-52
and accompanying text. The contractual rights and obligations arising from the listing agree-
ment are not relevant in the context of this Note and are not discussed.
12. See Romero, supra note 11, at 771-73. If the broker is the listing agent, he has contrac-
tually established the agency relationship with the seller. The rules prohibiting conflicts of
interest require that the broker work solely for the seller's benefit. Conversely, if the broker is
the cooperating agent, the law of agency views him as the seller's agent. Thus, the fiduciary
duties are owed to the seller, not to the purchaser. Id.
For a more detailed discussion of the effects of dual agency and conflicts of interest, see
infra notes 53-66 and accompanying text. See also H. MILLER & M. STARR, supra note 2,
§ 4:8, at 19.
13. See Bethlamy v. Bechtel, 91 Idaho 55, 67, 415 P.2d 698, 710 (1966), where the court
stated, "[t]he purchase of a home is not an everyday transaction for the average family and in
many instances is the most important transaction of a lifetime."
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from committing fraud on the purchaser.14 The broker is also obligated
to disclose to the buyer all known material defects.' 5
In early 1984, the California Court of Appeal for the First District
unanimously expanded the duty which a real estate broker owes to the
purchaser of residential property. In Easton v. Strassburger,"6 the court
held that the seller's real estate broker has "the affirmative duty to con-
duct a reasonably competent and diligent inspection of the residential
property listed for sale and to disclose to prospective purchasers all facts
materially affecting the value or desirability of the property that such an
investigation would reveal." 17 This new duty is stricter than that im-
posed on brokers in any other state. 8
The Easton decision, which significantly extends the real estate bro-
ker's duty and potential liability, warrants careful examination. This
Note analyzes the court's reasoning to determine whether the duty to
inspect is properly placed on the seller's broker. Further, this Note ex-
amines the potential scope of the new duty and projects the effects which
the duty will have on the California real estate industry. The Note con-
cludes that although the court's goal of purchaser protection is a positive
one, the realities of the transaction do not warrant imposing a duty to
inspect on the broker. Therefore, an alternative solution is proposed
which satisfies the court's goal of purchaser protection in a more efficient
and cost-effective manner.
14. See, e.g., Ford v. Cournale, 36 Cal. App. 3d 172, 111 Cal. Rptr. 334 (1973) (brokers
misrepresented to purchaser amount of rental income for an apartment building in order to
induce the purchase).
15. See Cooper v. Jevne, 56 Cal. App. 3d 860, 866, 128 Cal. Rptr. 724, 727 (1976); Lingsch
v. Savage, 213 Cal. App. 2d 729, 736, 29 Cal. Rptr. 201, 205 (1963). In both cases, the broker
represented the seller and thus had no fiduciary relationship with the purchaser. The court in
both cases nevertheless imposed on the broker the duty to disclose known defects to the
purchaser.
16. 152 Cal. App. 3d 90, 199 Cal. Rptr. 383 (1984).
17. Id. at 102, 199 Cal. Rptr. at 390 (footnote omitted).
18. Prior to the Easton decision, only a handful of states required a broker to disclose
known defects to the purchaser. See Lynn v. Taylor, 7 Kan. App. 2d 369, 642 P.2d 131 (1982)
(termites); Josephs v. Austin, 420 So. 2d 1181 (La. Ct. App. 1982), cert denied, 427 So. 2d 870
(La. 1983) (failure of structure's foundation); Neveroski v. Blair, 141 N.J. Super. 365, 358
A.2d 473 (1976) (termites); and Miles v. McSwegin, 58 Ohio St. 2d 97, 388 N.E.2d 1367 (1979)
(termites). These cases imposed the duty of disclosure on the broker under a rationale similar
to that used in Lingsch v. Savage, 213 Cal. App. 2d 729, 29 Cal. Rptr. 201 (1963), and Cooper
v. Jevne, 56 Cal. App. 3d 860, 128 Cal. Rptr. 724 (1976). See infra note 68.
California stands alone in the extent of protection provided to the purchaser, being the
only state which imposes on the broker the duty to inspect (as that duty is defined in Easton).
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II. STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Leticia Easton purchased a residential property from William and
Faith Strassburger in 1976.19 The property included a 3000 square foot
home, swimming pool and large guest house, all located on a one acre
parcel of land.20 At the time of purchase, the home was approximately
three years old.21 Unknown to Easton, the property had a history of soil
problems and landslides.22 Subsequent to Easton's purchase of the prop-
erty, "massive earth movement" occurred on two occasions. 23 The re-
sulting damage reduced the appraised value of the property from
$170,000 to an estimated $20,000.24
In 1976, Easton filed suit against the Strassburgers, Valley Realty
and the engineers and builders of the home.25 The Strassburgers had
listed the property for sale with two agents employed by Valley Realty.
These two agents represented the Strassburgers in the negotiations with
Easton and in the subsequent sales transaction.26 The Valley Realty
19. 152 Cal. App. 3d at 96, 199 Cal. Rptr. at 385.
20. Id., 199 Cal. Rptr. at 385.
21. The Strassburgers purchased the land in 1972 from George Sauer (one of the defend-
ants at the trial level), and commenced construction of the home, which was completed in
1973. The Strassburgers did not obtain a soil engineer's report prior to construction of their
home, as required by Contra Costa County. Brief for Respondent at 3, Easton v. Strassburger,
152 Cal. App. 3d 90, 199 Cal. Rptr. 383 (1984) [hereinafter cited as Brief for Respondent,
Easton]. They also built a swimming pool and an outside dance floor. In 1974, the Strass-
burgers converted a barn located on the property into the guest house. Id.
22. When grading the property, the original owner merely deposited fill dirt on the lot and
ran a tractor over it. Brief for Respondent at 2, Easton. In the late 1960's, prior to the Strass-
burger's ownership, there were two slides on the property. When the dirt from the slides was
replaced, it was not properly engineered or compacted. Id. at 2-3. In 1973, while the property
was owned by the Strassburgers, there was a minor slide involving 10 to 12 feet of the filled
slope. In 1975, a major slide occurred, causing the fill to drop approximately 10 feet in a
circular shape, 50 to 60 feet in diameter. 152 Cal. App. 3d at 96, 199 Cal. Rptr. at 386.
At the time of trial, tests showed that the fill under the house was between nine and 10
feet deep, while the piers supporting the house were only six feet deep. Additionally, the tests
of the fill showed only a 76% compaction, while the compaction standard in California is a
minimum of 90%. Brief for Respondent at 2-5, Easton.
23. 152 Cal. App. 3d at 96, 199 Cal. Rptr. at 385. These slides destroyed a portion of the
driveway, caused the foundation of the house to settle, caused cracks in the walls and warped
the doorways. Id., 199 Cal. Rptr. at 385.
24. Id., 199 Cal. Rptr. at 385. Additionally, estimates to repair the property and prevent
future slides ranged as high as $213,000. Id., 199 Cal. Rptr. at 385.
25. Only Valley Realty appealed the trial court's finding of liability. Id., 199 Cal. Rptr. at
385. See infra note 37 for the apportionment of liability between defendants.
26. Id at 96, 199 Cal. Rptr. at 385-86. Easton was represented in the transaction by an
agent employed by another real estate company. Although Easton did not join her agent as a
defendant, the jury found that agent five percent responsible for the loss. Id. at 97, 199 Cal.
Rptr. at 386.
In most residential sales, there are two brokers involved. The selling broker obtains the
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agents did not show the property to Easton, nor did they have any other
contact with her during the transaction.
27
Although the Strassburgers had knowledge of the previous soil
problems, they did not disclose those facts to Easton.2" The Strass-
burgers also failed to disclose the facts to their agents or anyone else at
Valley Realty.29 However, while touring and inspecting the property, the
Valley Realty agents noticed several "red flags" 0 which indicated poten-
tial soil problems.31 These red flag indicators included netting on the
hillside, uneven floors in the guest house and a retaining wall under con-
struction.32 The agents did not disclose their discovery of the red flags to
Easton, nor did they explain the possible significance of these items.33
The agents also failed to request that tests be conducted to determine soil
stability and neglected to take any further steps to determine whether
there had been previous slides or soil problems.34
Easton asserted causes of action against Valley Realty for fraudulent
concealment, intentional misrepresentation and negligent misrepresenta-
tion.3" The actions for fraudulent concealment and intentional misrepre-
sentation were voluntarily dismissed during trial. At the trial's
conclusion, the judge instructed the jury that real estate brokers have the
purchase offer from the buyer and is often referred to as the cooperating broker. See supra
note 1. For the problems raised by a cooperative sale and subagency, see infra notes 63-66 and
accompanying text.
27. Brief for Appellant at 2, Easton v. Strassburger, 152 Cal. App. 3d 90, 199 Cal. Rptr.
383 (1984) [hereinafter cited as Brief for Appellant, Easton].
28. 152 Cal. App. 3d at 97, 199 Cal. Rptr. at 386.
29. Id. at 96, 199 Cal. Rptr. at 386. The Strassburgers did not inform the agents of the
corrective actions taken after each slide. Id., 199 Cal. Rptr. at 386. These actions included
replacing the dirt after each slide (without compacting the soil or obtaining engineer's reports),
covering the hill with netting and planting at the top of the slope. Brief for Respondent at 3-4,
Easton.
30. A "red flag" is a readily observable indicator of a potential problem. Examples of red
flags include water-stained ceilings, cracks in the walls and modifications to the structure (e.g.,
converted garages). See Memorandum, California Association of Realtors®, The Easton Case:
Further Guidance For C.A.R. Members, at 2-3 (July 5, 1984), attached as an appendix to this
Note.
31. 152 Cal. App. 3d at 96, 199 Cal. Rptr. at 386. The agents' awareness of the red flags
was a disputed issue at trial. The agents claimed that they "did not observe any irregularities,"
Brief for Appellant at 1, Easton, while Easton claimed that the agents were aware of those
facts. Brief for Respondent at 1-1, Easton. The dispute as to the agents' actual knowledge of
the red flags may have influenced the court's holding. The decision reached by the court
allows the purchaser to recover despite a lack of actual knowledge by the broker. See infra
notes 102-05 and accompanying text.
32. 152 Cal. App. 3d at 104, 199 Cal. Rptr. at 391; Brief for Respondent at 11, Easton.
The probable use of the retaining wall was the control of soil. Id.
33. 152 Cal. App. 3d at 96, 199 Cal. Rptr. at 386.
34. Id. at 104, 199 Cal. Rptr. at 391.
35. Id. at 97-98, 199 Cal. Rptr. at 386.
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duty to investigate the property they sell and to disclose any defects
which are discovered. 6 The jury returned a verdict for Easton, finding
Valley Realty negligent for failing to investigate the property and dis-
close the soil defects.37
On appeal, Valley Realty argued that the trial court had misstated
the duty of real estate agents and claimed that an agent's duty is limited
to the disclosure of known defects. 38 The California Court of Appeal for
the First District rejected Valley Realty's argument, holding that a real
estate agent has a duty to investigate property which he sells and to dis-
close any defects to the purchaser.3 9
III. THE EASTON DECISION
A. The Broker's Duties Prior to Easton
1. Broker's duty to seller
The duty owed by a real estate broker to the seller of a home has
traditionally been defined by agency law. In most cases, the agency rela-
tionship between the broker and seller is established by a listing agree-
ment." In the typical listing contract, the broker agrees to provide
36. The jury instructions were as follows:
A real estate broker is a licensed person or entity who holds himself out to the public
as having particular skills and knowledge in the real estate field. He is under a duty
to disclose facts materially affecting the value or desirability of the property that are
known to him or which through reasonable diligence should be known to him.
Id. at 98, 199 Cal. Rptr. at 387 (emphasis added).
37. Id. at 97, 199 Cal. Rptr. at 386. Thejury awarded Easton $197,000. Under the princi-
ples of comparative negligence, liability was apportioned among the several defendants as fol-
lows: Valley Realty-5%; Strassburgers-65%; the various builders and engineers-25%;
Easton's agent (the cooperating broker)-5%. Id., 199 Cal. Rptr. at 386. Valley Realty was
the only solvent defendant and, based on joint and several liability, was thus liable for 100% of
the judgment.
38. Id. at 97, 199 Cal. Rptr. at 386. See infra note 68 and accompanying text for discus-
sion of the broker's duty to disclose known defects.
39. Id. at i02, 199 Cal. Rptr. at 390. On May 31, 1984, two months after the appellate
court decision, the California Supreme Court denied a hearing of the Easton case and also
declined to remove the opinion from publication. In the petition for hearing filed with the
supreme court, amicus briefs were submitted by the California Association of Realtors, the
National Association of Realtors, and the Associations of Realtors from Arizona, Hawaii and
Texas.
40. Romero, supra note 11, at 769. CAL. CIv. CODE § 1086(e) (West Supp. 1985) defines a
listing agreement as "a written contract between an owner of property and an agent by which
the agent has been authorized to sell the property or to find or obtain a buyer." See also
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 377 (1957) ("A person who makes a contract with
another to perform services as an agent for him is subject to a duty to act in accordance with
his promise.").
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competent service facilitating the sale of property in return for the seller's
promise to pay a commission upon successful completion of the sale.
An agency relationship may also be established in the absence of a
written listing agreement. An oral agreement between the parties may
suffice, or the parties' conduct may imply the relationship.41 For exam-
ple, the payment of a commission by the seller to the broker often indi-
cates that an agency relationship exists.4 2
Once the agency relationship is established, the broker becomes a
fiduciary with respect to matters within the scope of his agency.43 The
broker has the general duty to act in the highest good faith toward the
seller, who is his principal. 4 Various specific duties imposed on the bro-
ker pursuant to the agency include: (1) the obligation to make full and
complete disclosure to the principal of all facts material to the pending
transaction; 45 (2) the duty to account to the principal for all monies or
41. See, e.g., Anderson v. Thacher, 76 Cal. App. 2d 50, 65, 172 P.2d 533, 541 (1946) ("An
agency may be created not only by written instrument or by word of mouth but may be im-
plied from the conduct of the parties.").
42. H. MILLER & M. STARR, supra note 2, § 4:6, at 15. In Angus v. London, 92 Cal. App.
2d 282, 206 P.2d 869 (1949), the court found that the broker was the sellers' agent despite the
absence of a listing agreement. The existence of an agency relationship was based solely on
escrow instructions authorizing payment of a commission by the sellers. The fact that the
broker was the buyer's father was insufficient to establish a broker-purchaser agency relation-
ship. Id. at 285, 206 P.2d at 870-71.
43. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 13 (1957). See also supra notes 5-7 and ac-
companying text.
44. See, e.g., Timmsen v. Forest E. Olson, Inc., 6 Cal. App. 3d 860, 871, 86 Cal. Rptr. 359,
366 (1970). However, one commentator has noted that:
[T]he broker's interest is by its very nature somewhat adverse to the seller's. When
the broker, as negotiator between the contracting parties, works for a contingent fee
payable only if the realty is actually sold, he favors any sale to earn his fee with a
minimum time investment rather than risking loss of the sale and commission by
fully prosecuting the seller's interest to obtain the highest price.
Comment, supra note 10, at 1344 (analogizing the real estate broker to an attorney working
under a contingent fee arrangement).
For further discussion of the conflict between the broker's duty of good faith and his
desire to earn a commission, see Stambler & Stein, The Real Estate Broker-Schizophrenia or
Conflict of Interests, 28 J. B.A.D.C. 16 (1961); Note, Brokers-Dual Agency-Separable
Transactions, 8 U. KAN. L. REV. 462 (1960).
45. See, e.g., McPhetridge v. Smith, 101 Cal. App. 122, 139, 281 P. 419, 426 (1929)
("agent shall make known to his principal every material fact concerning his transactions and
the subject matter of his agency that comes to his knowledge"). See also CAL. CIV. CODE
§ 2020 (West 1954) ("An agent must use ordinary diligence to keep his principal informed of
his acts in the course of the agency."); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 381 (1957)
("agent is subject to a duty to use reasonable efforts to give his principal information which is
relevant to affairs entrusted to him and which. . . the principal would desire to have and
which can be communicated without violating a superior duty to a third person").
A fact is material if" 'it is one which the agent should realize would be likely to affect the
judgment of the principal in giving his consent. . . or [is] likely to have a bearing upon the
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other property which he receives from, or on behalf of, the principal;"
and (3) the duty to refrain from making any misrepresentation to the
principal.47
In California, many of the broker's duties to the seller arising under
the common law of agency have been codified in the Business and Profes-
sions Code. Section 10176 of this code provides that the real estate com-
missioner may revoke the license of any agent guilty of making
misrepresentations or false promises.48 The legislative purpose in passing
this statute was to provide the public with greater protection in real es-
tate transactions.49 As a result of this code section, a real estate broker
who breaches the specified duties may be subject to civil liability as well
as to disciplinary action brought by the real estate commissioner."0
An additional obligation which the broker owes to the seller is to
desirability of the transaction from the viewpoint of the principal.'" Fisher v. Losey, 78 Cal.
App. 2d 121, 124, 177 P.2d 334, 336 (1947) (quoting RESTATEMENT OF AGENCY § 390 com-
ment a (1933)).
Among the facts which California courts have found to be material, and thus subject to
disclosure, are: (a) offers to purchase the property, regardless of whether the broker considers
the offers attractive (Simone v. McKee, 142 Cal. App. 2d 307, 312, 298 P.2d 667, 671 (1956));
(b) the identity of the purchaser (where the purchaser is the broker, or a relative, friend or
associate) (Batson v. Strehlow, 68 Cal. 2d 662, 675, 441 P.2d 101, 110, 68 Cal. Rptr. 589, 598
(1968); Smith v. Zak, 20 Cal. App. 3d 785, 794, 98 Cal. Rptr. 242, 247 (1971)); and (c) the fact
that the broker is acting for more than one party to the transaction without the parties' in-
formed consent (Smith, 20 Cal. App. 3d 785, 793, 98 Cal. Rptr. 242, 247 (1971)).
46. See, eg., Savage v. Mayer, 33 Cal. 2d 548, 551, 203 P.2d 9, 10 (1949).
47. CAL. CIV. CODE § 2228 (West 1954). See supra note- 7.
48. CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 10176 (West Supp. 1985). Section 10176 provides in per-
tinent part:
The [real estate] commissioner may. . . revoke a real estate license at any time
where the licensee. . . in performing. . . any of the acts within the scope of this
chapter has been guilty of any of the following:
(a) Making any substantial misrepresentation.
(b) Making any false promises of a character likely to influence, persuade or
induce.
(c) A continued and flagrant course of misrepresentation or making of false
promises through real estate agents or salesmen.
(d) Acting for more than one party in a transaction without the knowledge or
consent of all parties thereto.
(i) Any other conduct, whether of the same or a different character than speci-
fied in this section, which constitutes fraud or dishonest dealing.
Compare § 10176 to the common law agency duties discussed supra at note 45 and accompa-
nying text.
49. See Burch v. Argus Properties, Inc., 92 Cal. App. 3d 128, 131-32, 154 Cal. Rptr. 485,
487 (1979); Rylander v. Karpe, 60 Cal. App. 3d 317, 321, 131 Cal. Rptr. 415, 417 (1976) ("A
key purpose in enacting the Real Estate Law was to upgrade the standards of the profession
and also to insure, as far as possible, that real estate brokers and salesmen will be honest and
truthful with their clients.").
50. H. MILLER & M. STARR, supra note 2, § 4:15, at 34-35. Section 10177 of the Business
and Professions Code authorizes the commissioner to suspend or revoke the license of a licen-
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exercise reasonable skill and care to avoid negligent acts. This standard
has been interpreted as requiring the agent to use reasonable skill and
care to effect a sale to the best advantage of the seller.5" An agent who
fails to use the requisite skill and care may be held liable for any losses
which the principal sustains as the result of a breach of such duty.52
2. Broker's duty to purchaser
Under general agency principles, the terms of the parties' agreement
define the extent and existence of fiduciary obligations.5 3 In real estate
transactions, there are several problems in establishing the existence of a
broker-purchaser agency relationship. Therefore, it is difficult to pre-
cisely define the extent of the fiduciary duties which the broker owes to
the buyer.
First, unlike the seller, the purchaser of a home rarely has a contrac-
tual relationship with the broker.54 The buyer's offer to purchase the
property is communicated to the seller either by the listing broker or
cooperating broker.55 In either situation, the purchaser's relationship
with the broker is non-contractual.
California courts have found that a broker-purchaser agency rela-
see who violates any section of the real estate statutes. CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 10177
(West Supp. 1985).
51. See Lyon v. Giannoni, 168 Cal. App. 2d 336, 339, 335 P.2d 690, 692 (1959). See also
H. MILLER & M. STARR, supra note 2, § 4:16, at 48-50.
52. See Timmsen v. Forest E. Olson, Inc., 6 Cal. App. 3d 860, 871, 86 Cal. Rptr. 359, 366
(1970). See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 379 (1957) ("Unless otherwise
agreed, a paid agent is subject to a duty to the principal to act with standard care and with the
skill which is standard in the locality for the kind of work which he is employed to perform
and, in addition, to exercise any special skill that he has.").
53. See Anderson v. Badger, 84 Cal. App. 2d 736, 743, 191 P.2d 768, 772 (1948) (" 'exist-
ence and extent of the duties of the agent to the principal are determined by the terms of the
agreement between the parties'" (quoting RESTATEMENT OF AGENCY § 376 (1933))).
54. In rare cases, a prospective purchaser of residential property may engage an agent to
locate a home and pay a fee for that service. This arrangement is more common in commercial
situations, where a corporation pays a broker to locate suitable office space or land.
55. Representation by the listing agent, see supra note 1, usually occurs when that broker
is contacted by the buyer, either from an advertisement of the home or from a "For Sale" sign
placed at the property. When contacted, the broker shows the home to the prospective pur-
chaser and attempts to convice him to purchase the property. In this situation, the listing
agent is the only agent involved in the transaction. For the conflicts of interest problem this
creates, see infra notes 60-62 and accompanying text.
The purchaser is represented by a cooperating broker, see supra note 1, when he contacts
an agent and asks that agent to locate a suitable home. After inquiring about relevant informa-
tion (size and location desired, price range and payments desired, buyer's income and credit
rating, etc.), the agent attempts to locate a property matching the purchaser's specifications.
In this situation, the rules governing subagency often create problems for the purchaser. See
infra notes 64-66.
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tionship may arise from the circumstances surrounding the transaction.5 6
For example, in Ramey v. Myers,57 the court inferred a broker-purchaser
agency relationship from the broker's friendship with the purchaser and
the fact that the broker gave the purchaser advice on the transaction. 8
From the buyer's viewpoint, this approach is not entirely satisfac-
tory. While the listing agreement specifically creates a broker-seller
agency relationship, the purchaser must rely on the hindsight of a judge
or jury to infer the agency from circumstances surrounding the transac-
tion. If the existence of an agency relationship is not found, no fiduciary
obligations are owed to the purchaser.
The second problem is that the rules prohibiting conflicts of interest
often prevent the purchaser from receiving the benefit of fiduciary obliga-
tions.5 9 In a transaction where the listing agent is the only broker in-
volved,60 a conflict arises when the agent attempts to negotiate the
conflicting interests of the purchaser and the seller.61 By definition, an
agent is unable to "act in the highest good faith" toward both parties.62
Because the listing agreement establishes the broker-seller agency and
56. See, e.g., Ramey v. Myers, 111 Cal. App. 2d 679, 245 P.2d 360 (1952). See also Quinn
v. Phipps, 93 Fla. 805, 113 So. 419 (1927), where the court found that the broker's fiduciary
duties to the purchaser arose from the buyer's reliance on the broker's oral promise to commu-
nicate an offer to the seller. The court stated that a fiduciary relationship may "exist whenever
one man trusts in and relies upon another." Id. at 809-10, 113 So. at 421.
57. 111 Cal. App. 2d 679, 245 P.2d 360 (1952).
58. Id. at 685-86, 245 P.2d at 364.
59. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 387 (1957) states that "an agent is subject to
a duty to his principal to act solely for the benefit of the principal in all matters connected with
his agency" (emphasis added).
60. See supra note 55 and accompanying text.
61. Related to the duty to disclose all material facts, supra note 45, is the obligation "not
to use or to communicate information confidentially given him by the principal or acquired by
him during the course of... his agency. . . to the injury of the principal." RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF AGENCY § 395 (1957) (emphasis added).
An example of such information is the disclosure of a defect to the purchaser. While the
prospective buyer wishes to know of any defects, disclosure may injure the seller's interests by
preventing him from obtaining the maximum price for the property. Ignoring the fact that the
seller's non-disclosure constitutes fraud upon the buyer, "the conclusion is inescapable that
when the broker is under a duty to disclose material defects to the buyer, it is at the expense of
the duty of loyalty to the seller." Comment, supra note 10, at 1352.
Despite the fact that disclosure conflicts with the duty owed to the seller, California
courts have imposed on the broker the duty to disclose known material defects to the pur-
chaser. This disclosure is not based on an agency relationship but rather is founded on public
policy. See infra note 69 and accompanying text for a discussion of this issue.
62. One commentator stated that "[i]t is unrealistic to expect the broker in a real estate
transaction to be able to fulfill these fiduciary duties of utmost loyalty, care, and complete
disclosure to both the buyer and the seller." Note, Real Estate Brokers' Duties to Prospective
Purchasers, 1976 B.Y.U. L. REv. 513, 527.
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agency law prohibits actions adverse to the principal, it can be seen that
the purchaser's interests will not be protected.
Finally, in the situation where the purchaser is represented by a co-
operating broker,63 the rules of subagency may prevent the establishment
of a broker-purchaser agency relationship. The law views this cooperat-
ing broker as a subagent of the seller.' 4 , As a subagent, the cooperating
broker has the same fiduciary obligations to the seller as those which are
imposed on the listing agent.65 In mary transactions, the purchaser may
spend many hours with, and place much confidence in, the cooperating
broker. In spite of this, the subagency relationship with the seller gener-
ally precludes the establishment of a broker-purchaser agency
relationship.66
63. When an agent lists a property for sale, the seller commonly authorizes the agent to
place the listing with the local real estate board's multiple listing service. This agreement
expressly authorizes other agents to procure a purchaser in accordance with the terms of the
listing. See H. MILLER & M. STARR, supra note 2, § 4:8, at 18-19. Typically, the selling
broker uses the multiple listing service to obtain a list of suitable properties, all or some of
which may be shown to the prospective purchaser.
This arrangement is advantageous to the seller, as it facilitates a quicker sale of the prop-
erty. The multiple listing service enables the listing to be distributed to all other real estate
offices which are members of the local Board of Realtors. This distribution greatly expands
the pool of potential purchasers and thus increases the likelihood that the property will be
sold.
64. See REsTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 5(1) (1957) ("A subagent is a person ap-
pointed by an agent empowered to do so, to perform functions undertaken by the agent for the
principal. . . ."); see also Romero, supra note 11, at 722 ("[A]ny broker who is not the listing
broker but is attempting to effect a sale of the property in cooperation with the listing agent is
considered a subagent.").
65. See Kruse v. Miller, 143 Cal. App. 2d 656, 300 P.2d 855 (1956). In Kruse, the court
found that although the cooperating broker had no contact with the seller, the broker was
nevertheless acting as a subagent and thus had "the same duty [as the listing agent] to act in
the utmost good faith." Id. at 660, 300 P.2d at 857-58.
See also CAL. CIV. CODE § 2351 (West 1954) ("[a] sub-agent. . . represents the principal
in like manner with the original agent"); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 5 comment
d (1957) ("subagent stands in a fiduciary relation to the principal, and is subject to all the
liabilities of an agent to the principal"); Comment, supra note 10, at 1353 ("The result of this
[subagency] arrangement is that both brokers represent the seller and neither represents the
buyer."); Romero, supra note 11, at 772.
66. See Romero, supra note 11, at 772 & n.29 ("A buyer can never benefit from a broker's
knowledge as to defects, unless he hires an outside broker having no other connection with the
transaction."); Comment, supra note 10, at 1353.
One California court judge, noting the inherent conflicts in the subagency relationship
and the precarious position in which it leaves the purchaser, has called for clarification of the
obligations of the cooperating broker. See Cook v. Westersund, 179 Cal. Rptr. 396 (1981)
(The California Supreme Court granted a hearing in Cook in early 1982, but later dismissed
the appeal. Thus, there is no official citation to the case.). There, Associate Justice Regan
stated:
The confusion as to which party a broker represents is altogether too common.
It would behoove real estate brokers to follow the advice of various authors to pro-
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California courts have recognized that the difficulty of establishing
an agency relationship and the problems of conflicting fiduciary responsi-
bilities often leave the purchaser unprotected in real estate transactions.
In the absence of other duties, the rules of agency would often preclude
the broker from owing any obligation to the purchaser. 7 Accordingly,
the courts have sought to provide additional protection to the purchaser.
Specifically, the courts require that:
[W]here a real estate broker or agent, representing the seller,
knows facts materially affecting the value or desirability of
property offered for sale and these facts are known or accessible
only to him and his principal, and the broker or agent also
knows that these facts are not known to or within the reach of
the diligent attention and observation of the buyer, the broker
or agent is under a duty to disclose these facts to the buyer. 8
vide in writing the precise nature of their relationship with the principals involved in
a particular transaction. "The broker owes various fiduciary duties to the principal
. . . , and in some situations, the buyer's broker may be considered a subagent of the
seller. . . . To avoid the problem of dual representation and possible discipline...
the buyer's broker should give the seller written notice of his or her position as
buyer's agent. In addition the buyer's broker might want to obtain the seller's writ-
ten acknowledgement. .. ."
It has been suggested that "express provisions in listing agreements and deposit
receipts should (I) establish the cooperating broker as an independent representative
of the buyer; (2) establish a single fiduciary duty of the cooperating broker to the
buyer; (3) remove the subagency relationship between the cooperating broker and
listing broker; and (4) remove liability of a seller for acts of the cooperating broker."
Id. at 400 n.4 (citations omitted).
The California Legislature has recently taken the first step in remedying this confusion.
Proposed legislation would require every broker to act within defined limits and to disclose
those limits in writing to the parties in the transaction. The statute is designed to ensure that
both the buyer and seller understand the fiduciary obligations which they are owed by the
broker. See A.B. 1125, Reg. Sess. (1985) (introduced by Assembly Member Connelly on Feb-
ruary 28, 1985).
67. See supra notes 53-66.
68. Cooper v. Jevne, 56 Cal. App. 3d 860, 866, 128 Cal. Rptr. 724, 727 (1976) (citing
Lingsch v. Savage, 213 Cal. App. 2d 729, 735-36, 29 Cal. Rptr. 201, 205 (1963)).
In Cooper, the sales agents of a condominium project had knowledge that the project was
constructed in a substandard manner and violated minimum requirements of the Uniform
Building Code. Despite this knowledge, the agents described the condominiums as "luxuri-
ous" and as "outstanding investments." The court stated that the agents were reckless in
stating those opinions in light of their knowledge and that the failure to disclose that knowl-
edge to the purchaser constituted "negative fraud or deceit." Id. at 866, 128 Cal. Rptr. at 727
(emphasis in original).
In Lingsch, the seller's broker allegedly knew that the property was in a state of disrepair,
that the units were illegal and that the building had been condemned. The court found that
the broker's knowledge, and failure to disclose the subject of that knowledge, constituted
fraud. Lingsch v. Savage, 213 Cal. App. 2d 729, 736-37, 29 Cal. Rptr. 201, 205-06 (1963).
It should be noted that in both cases the broker was found to be the agent of the seller, yet
the court imposed an affirmative obligation in favor of the purchaser. As the Lingsch court
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The foregoing rule mitigates the purchaser's lack of protection
caused by the broker's fiduciary obligations to the seller. This rule is not
based on agency principles but instead on a policy of protecting the pur-
chaser by preventing broker fraud.69
In addition to the duty to disclose known material facts, the broker
must not make representations to the purchaser without knowing the
truth of those representations.70 A real estate broker who undertakes to
speak on a matter, either voluntarily or in response to a question, is
bound to speak truthfully and not conceal any material facts.7 Once the
broker speaks, he must make a full disclosure.7 2 The broker is obliged to
obtain information regarding any matter on which he speaks in order to
avoid the possibility of misrepresenting the facts.73 The courts have rea-
soned that the purchaser, who generally relies on the broker, should re-
ceive only that information which the broker knows is accurate and
truthful.
74
explained, "[i]t is not necessary that there be a contractual relationship between the agent or
broker and the buyer. . . [because] '[a]n action for deceit does not require privity of con-
tract.'" 213 Cal. App. 2d at 736, 29 Cal. Rptr. at 205 (citations omitted).
Examples of other material facts requiring disclosure to the purchaser are: improvements
made to the property without a building permit and in violation of zoning regulations (Barder
v. McClung, 93 Cal. App. 2d 692, 209 P.2d 808 (1949)); construction of a house in violation of
building codes (Curran v. Heslop, 115 Cal. App. 2d 476, 252 P.2d 378 (1953)); and construc-
tion of a house on filled land (Burkett v. J.A. Thompson & Son, 150 Cal. App.2d 523, 310 P.2d
56 (1957)).
69. Rylander v. Karpe, 60 Cal. App. 3d 317, 321, 131 Cal. Rptr. 415, 417 (1976) ("A key
purpose in enacting the Real Estate Law was to upgrade the standards of the profession and
also to insure, as far as possible, that real estate brokers and salesmen will be honest and
truthful with their clients.").
70. See Brady v. Carman, 179 Cal. App. 2d 63, 3 Cal. Rptr. 612 (1960). See also
Spargnapani v. Wright, 110 A.2d 82 (D.C. Cir. 1954). There, the broker made representations
to the purchaser regarding the capabilities of the heating system, despite the fact that the
broker had no actual knowledge of the true facts. In actuality, the home's boiler was inopera-
tive. The court stated that "'[flraud includes the pretense of knowledge when knowledge
there is none."' Id. at 83-84 (quoting Ultramares Corp. v. Touche, 255 N.Y. 170, 179, 174
N.E. 441, 444 (1931) (Cardozo, J.)).
71. 179 Cal. App. 2d at 68, 3 Cal. Rptr. at 615. In Brady, the purchasers questioned the
broker about the presence of an easement across their property. Although the purchasers were
aware that the easement existed, they did not understand its significance. In answer to their
inquiries, the broker told the purchasers that the easement was "nothing. . . to worry about."
The court found that the broker's evasive answers discouraged further investigation by the
purchasers and thus constituted a fraudulent act. Id., 3 Cal. Rptr. at 615-16.
72. Id., 3 Cal. Rptr. at 615.
73. Id. at 68-69, 3 Cal. Rptr. at 616.
74. One commentator has noted that:
Often, the broker has been in the company of the purchaser for many hours and has
conducted some fairly confidential interviews with the prospective purchaser. Given
such extensive conduct with the buyer, . . . [the purchaser] is justified in believing
that the agent will do his best to obtain the property for the buyer at the lowest
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California courts have also held that a broker who voluntarily as-
sumes a relationship with an individual75 has a duty to exercise reason-
able care to avoid negligently injuring that person.76 However, cases
which discuss broker negligence often include allegations of intentional
misrepresentation or failure to disclose, making analysis of the negligence
duty difficult. 7
possible price and on the most advantageous terms. . . . [I]t would be unrealistic to
expect the buyer to feel that a broker who has worked with him extensively is at-
tempting to obtain the highest possible price for the seller, which, in actuality, is the
agent's duty.
Romero, supra note 11, at 772-73 (footnotes omitted).
Another author has stated that:
mhe buyer usually expects the broker to protect his interests. This trust and confi-
dence derives from the potential value of the broker's service; houses are infrequently
purchased and require a trained eye to determine value and fitness. In addition,
financing is often complex. . . . T]he buyer relies heavily on [the agent's] acquired
skill and knowledge, first because of the complexity of the transaction and second
because of his own dearth of experience.
Comment, supra note 10, at 1343 (quoted in Easton v. Strassburger, 152 Cal. App. 3d 90, 100,
199 Cal. Rptr. 383, 388 (1984)).
However, because of the conflict of interest arising from subagency and dual representa-
tion, this reliance may be misplaced. See supra notes 59-66. One author has stated that:
In the typical residential real estate transaction, however, the buyer. . . may be
intentionally or inadvertently led. . . to believe the broker will represent his interest
even where he is aware the broker has a listing agreement with the seller. Since the
broker's commission is generally paid as a percentage of the sales price, the broker's
interest is more closely identified with that of the seller than of the buyer. Where the
buyer is unappreciative of the potentially divided loyalty of the broker, he may be
lulled into relying on the broker to his significant detriment. Misplaced reliance by
the buyer can extend beyond the issue of price to questions regarding quality of title,
condition of the premises, and proration of closing costs, property taxes, recording
fees, and other expenses.
Sinclair, The Duty of the Broker to Purchasers and Prospective Purchasers of Real Property in
Illinois, 69 ILL. B.J. 260, 263-64 (1981) (quoted in Easton v. Strassburger, 152 Cal. App. 3d 90,
101 n.4, 199 Cal. Rptr. 383, 389 n.4 (1984)).
75. One example of a voluntary relationship assumed by the broker is when he shows
property to the purchaser. See infra note 76.
76. See, eg., Merrill v. Buck, 58 Cal. 2d 552, 375 P.2d 304, 25 Cal. Rptr. 456 (1962). In
Merrill, the defendant real estate agent showed property to a potential renter. Despite the
agent's knowledge of the hazardous conditions of the basement stairs (no landing at the top,
eight-inch drop from hallway to top step, no handrails and poor lighting), she did not point
them out to the client, nor did she disclose the existence of the basement door, which was
partially hidden. Upon renting the property, the tenant discovered the door. Assuming it led
into a closet, she opened the door and fell seven feet into the basement. The court stated that:
[H]aving affirmatively undertaken to show the house to [the prospective lessee] in the
regular course of their business with the purpose of earning a commission if she
decided to rent it, these defendants were under a duty of care to warn her of a con-
cealed danger in the premises of which they were aware and from which her injury
might be reasonably foreseen if she did become a tenant.
Id. at 562, 375 P.2d at 310, 25 Cal. Rptr. at 462.
77. See, e.g., Wilson v. Hisey, 147 Cal. App. 2d 433, 305 P.2d 686 (1957) (The broker's
failure to obtain a title search was not, by itself, a negligent act. However, when combined
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B. Reasoning of the Easton Court
In Easton v. Strassburger,78 the California Court of Appeal held that
in a residential real estate transaction, the seller's broker is under a duty
to conduct a reasonable and competent inspection of residential property
and to disclose to the purchasers all material facts discovered in that
investigation.7 9 In reaching its conclusion, the court reviewed the duty
which a real estate broker owes to the purchaser of residential property.80
The court noted that California law, propounded in Lingsch v. Savage 81
and Cooper v. Jevne,82 requires the seller's broker to disclose to the pur-
chaser all material defects which are known to the broker, but which are
unknown to and unobservable by the buyer.8 3 The court observed that
the judgment against Valley Realty was for negligence, while the cases
cited as authority for the duty to disclose were based on fraud.84 How-
ever, the court reasoned that implicit in the holdings of Lingsch and
Cooper is a duty to search for defects which a broker could reasonably
discover.85 The Easton court explained that those cases did not discuss
the implicit duty to investigate because such a duty is "superfluous to the
issue of fraud."86
with a misrepresentation regarding the title's status, that omission constituted a lack of reason-
able care and diligence in the exercise of his duty.).
In Merrill, supra note 76, the court discussed the fact that the agent had knowledge of the
hazardous condition, such that the duty to disclose arose from that knowledge. The court
attached moral blame to the agent's failure to warn. Merrill v. Buck, 58 Cal. 2d 552, 563, 375
P.2d 304, 310, 25 Cal. Rptr. 456, 462 (1962).
78. 152 Cal. App. 3d 90, 199 Cal. Rptr. 383 (1984).
79. Id. at 102, 199 Cal. Rptr. at 390. Judge Kline phrased the issue before the court as
"whether a broker is negligent if he fails to disclose defects which he should have discovered
through reasonable diligence." Id. at 99, 199 Cal. Rptr. at 387.
80. The court specifically limited the holding to residential property transactions, expres-
sing no opinion on whether the broker has an obligation to inspect commercial property for
the benefit of the buyer. Id. at 102 n.8, 199 Cal. Rptr. at 390 n.8. The court reasoned that the
purchaser of commercial real estate is more experienced and sophisticated than the purchaser
of residential property. Id, 199 Cal. Rptr. at 390 n.8. The court also noted that the commer-
cial property purchaser is likely to engage an agent to exclusively represent his interests, while
the residential purchaser must contend with the problems of subagency and conflict of interest.
81. 213 Cal. App. 2d 729, 29 Cal. Rptr. 201 (1963).
82. 56 Cal. App. 3d 860, 128 Cal. Rptr. 724 (1976).
83. 152 Cal. App. 3d at 99, 199 Cal. Rptr. at 387. See supra note 68 for a discussion of
Lingsch and Cooper.
84. The court stated: "Admittedly, no appellate decision has explicitly declared that a
broker is under a duty to disclose material facts which he should have known." 152 Cal. App.
3d at 99, 199 Cal. Rptr. at 388.
85. Id., 199 Cal. Rptr. at 388. The court found a duty to inspect implied in the rule of
Lingsch and Cooper, "which speaks not only to facts known by the broker, but also and inde-
pendently to facts that are accessible only to him and his principal." Id., 199 Cal. Rptr. at 388
(emphasis in original).
86. Id. at 103, 199 Cal. Rptr. at 390. Fraud arises when the broker fails to disclose known
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The court made three arguments in support of adopting the affirma-
tive duty to inspect. First, the Easton court reasoned that purchaser pro-
tection would be enhanced by requiring the seller's agent to inspect
property for the purchaser's benefit."7 Conversely, a rule limiting disclo-
sure to facts actually known by the broker would result in decreased pro-
tection for the purchaser. The court determined that such a rule would
provide a disincentive for brokers to make any property inspections.88
This disincentive would adversely affect the puchaser, who relies on the
seller's broker for information.
8 9
Second, the court justified the imposition of a duty to inspect under
a cost-benefit analysis. The court noted the "relative ease with which the
burden [of a duty to inspect] can be sustained by brokers." 90 Weighing
this relative ease against the substantial benefit obtained by the pur-
chaser,91 the court concluded that adoption of the duty was amply
warranted. 92
facts. The broker may acquire this knowledge from the seller or through independent means.
In the case of fraud, imposition of a duty to inspect would be superfluous, as knowledge of the
defects already exists. Thus, in cases such as Lingsch and Cooper, it was unnecessary to discuss
a duty to inspect. Such a discussion becomes relevant only where, as in Easton, it cannot be
proven that the broker had actual knowledge of the defects.
87. Id. at 99-100, 199 Cal. Rptr. at 388. In previous cases, the duty to disclose known
defects was imposed to protect the unwary and inexperienced purchaser from the "unethical
broker and seller." Id. at 99, 199 Cal. Rptr. at 388. The policy of disclosure insures "that the
buyer is provided sufficient accurate information to make an informed decision whether to
purchase." Id., 199 Cal. Rptr. at 388.
The purchaser of residential property has traditionally been characterized as unwary, un-
sophisticated and uneducated. It has been stated that the "unsophisticated buyer" must rely
upon the broker's skill and knowledge "because of his own dearth of experience." Comment,
supra note 10, at 1343.
88. 152 Cal. App. 3d at 99-100, 199 Cal. Rptr. at 388. The court reasoned that limiting
the duty of disclosure to known defects would provide the "unscrupulous broker the unilateral
ability to protect himself." Id. at 100, 199 Cal. Rptr. at 388. By making no inspection, the
broker would not discover any material facts, and thus the duty to disclose would not arise.
Similarly, the uneducated broker, having insufficient experience to discover defects, would be
relieved of the duty to disclose known material facts. Therefore, his own incompetence would
shield him from liability. Id., 199 Cal. Rptr. at 388.
The court, in requiring the seller's broker to disclose defects to the purchaser, did not
address the problem of conflicting interests. Under the Lingsch and Cooper cases, California
courts have ruled that the seller's interest in fiduciary confidentiality is outweighed by the
purchaser's need to avoid being defrauded. See supra notes 68-69. The Easton decision has
expanded that policy, such that the seller's interest in fiduciary confidentiality is outweighed by
the purchaser's need to acquire knowledge of all property defects.
89. Id., 199 Cal. Rptr. at 388 ("[I]n residential sales transactions the seller's broker is most
frequently the best situated to obtain and provide the most reliable information on the prop-
erty and is ordinarily counted on to do so.").
90. Id. at 101, 199 Cal. Rptr. at 389.
91. Id., 199 Cal. Rptr. at 389.
92. Id. at 100-01, 199 Cal. Rptr. at 389.
1985] EASTON V STRASSBURGER
Third, the court found support for its holding in the Code of Ethics
of the National Association of Realtors (NAR).93 The code states that
"[t]he REALTOR® shall avoid exaggeration, misrepresentation, or con-
cealment of pertinent facts. He has an affirmative obligation to discover
adverse factors that a reasonably competent and diligent investigation
would disclose."94 In a footnote, the court quoted and discussed a code
hypothetical which was analogous to the facts of the Easton case.95 The
court inferred that the hypothetical's conclusion, that the Realtor vio-
lated the code by failing to conduct a reasonably diligent search, was
correct. 96 The court reasoned that adopting the duty to inspect did noth-
93. The Code of Ethics is a compilation of the standards and rules of conduct which the
National Association of Realtors imposes on its members. The members voluntarily agree to
assume these obligations, which are in addition to the obligations imposed by the courts and
real estate statutes. See H. MILLER & M. STARR, supra note 2, § 6:37, at 164.
94. NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF REALTORS®, INTERPRETATIONS OF THE CODE OF ETH-
ics, Article 9 at X (7th ed. 1978) [hereinafter cited as INTERPRETATIONS I].
95. 152 Cal. App. 3d at 101-02 n.6, 199 Cal. Rptr. at 398-90 n.6. Case #9-10 of INTER-
PRETATIONS I, supra note 94, discusses the obligation to ascertain pertinent facts, using the
following hypothetical:
Shortly after REALTOR® A negotiated the sale of a home to Buyer B a com-
plaint came to the Board charging REALTOR® A with failure to disclose a substan-
tial fact concerning the property. The charge was that the house was not connected
to the city sanitary sewage system, but had a septic tank, whereas the buyer claimed
he had every reason to believe the house was connected with the sewer line.
In a statement to the Board's Grievance Committee, Buyer B agreed that the
subject was not discussed during his various conversations with REALTOR® A
about the house. However, he pointed out that his own independent inquiries had
revealed that the street on which the house was located was "sewered" and he had
naturally assumed the house was connected. He had since determined that every
other house on the street for several blocks in both directions was connected. He
stated that REALTOR® A, in not having disclosed the exceptional situation, had
failed to disclose a pertinent fact.
REALTOR® A's defense in a hearing before the Board's Professional Standards
Committee was (1) that he did not know that this particular house was not connected
with the sewer; (2) that in advertising the house he had not represented it as being
connected; (3) that at no time, as Buyer B conceded, had he orally stated that the
house was connected; that the fact under discussion was not a "pertinent fact" within
the meaning of the Code of Ethics.
The Committee determined that the absence of sewer connection in an area
where other houses were connected was a substantial and pertinent fact in the trans-
action; that the absence of any mention of this fact in advertising or oral representa-
tion made it no less pertinent; that ascertaining the failure of previous owners to
connect with the available sewer line was within REALTOR® A's obligation under
Article 9 of the Code; that he was, therefore, in violation of Article 9.
INTERPRETATIONS I, supra note 94, Case #9-10, at 74. The Easton court stated that "[ilt may
be observed that the defect in this example-the lack of a conventional sewage connection-
would not in the circumstances described likely be as apparent to a broker as the defect at issue
in the case at bar." 152 Cal. App. 3d at 102 n.6, 199 Cal. Rptr. at 390 n.6.
It should be noted that the court cited an older edition of the Code of Ethics. For the
language of the newer edition, and the effect of the amended language on the court's reasoning,
see infra notes 153-56.
96. 152 Cal. App. 3d at 102 n.6, 199 Cal. Rptr. at 390 n.6.
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ing more than judicially impose an obligation which Realtors had previ-
ously imposed upon themselves.97
Additionally, the Easton court based the imposition of a duty to in-
spect on precedent, stating that "[t]his implicit duty of all real estate
agents . . . is reflected in the law."98 In support of this position, the
court quoted language from Brady v. Carman,99 where it was stated that
the broker "'was obliged as a professional man to obtain information
about the easement and make a full disclosure of the burdens it imposed
on the land.' , The court acknowledged that the action in Brady was
based on fraud rather than negligence, but reasoned that the broker's
obligation to obtain information should not "be allowed to vary with the
cause of action." 101
In discussing the future application of its decision, the Easton court
noted the vital importance of distinguishing between fraud and negli-
gence causes of action. 2 The duty to disclose required in cases such as
Lingsch and Cooper arises only when the broker has actual knowledge of
material facts, or they are "accessible only to the broker and his princi-
pal."10' 3 Conversely, if the cause of action is for negligence, as in Easton,
the purchaser need not allege nor prove that the broker had actual
knowledge of the material facts."° Also, the buyer need not show that
the material facts were accessible only to the broker or the seller.105
Finally, the court explained that the broker's duty to inspect applies
even in situations where the defects are not beyond the "diligent atten-
tion and observation of the buyer."10 6 However, the court expressly pro-
vided for the application of comparative negligence principles to an
Easton-type situation."0 7 The court stated that the comparative negli-
97. The Easton court stated that "the duty to disclose that which should be known is a
formally acknowledged professional obligation that it appears many brokers customarily im-
pose upon themselves as an ethical matter." Id. at 101, 199 Cal. Rptr. at 389. See infra note
152 for a discussion of the use of the code's provisions as a standard of negligence.
98. 152 Cal. App. 3d at 102, 199 Cal. Rptr. at 390 (footnotes omitted).
99. 179 Cal. App. 2d 63, 3 Cal. Rptr. 612 (1960).
100. 152 Cal. App. 3d at 102, 199 Cal. Rptr. at 390 (emphasis in original) (quoting Brady,
179 Cal. App. 2d at 68-69, 3 Cal. Rptr. at 616).
101. Id. at 102, 199 Cal. Rptr. at 390.
102. Id. at 103, 199 Cal. Rptr. at 390.
103. Id., 199 Cal. Rptr. at 390. If the facts are accessible only to the broker, the court
stated, that broker "may constructively be deemed to have had actual knowledge." Id., 199
Cal. Rptr. at 390.
104. Id., 199 Cal. Rptr. at 390.
105. Id., 199 Cal. Rptr. at 390.
106. Id., 199 Cal. Rptr. at 390.
107. Id. at 103, 199 Cal. Rptr. at 391 (citing Li v. Yellow Cab Co., 13 Cal. 3d 804, 532 P.2d
1226, 119 Cal. Rptr. 858 (1975)).
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gence doctrine provides "adequate protection to a broker who neglects to
explicitly disclose manifest defects." 1 8 Thus, the court cautioned that
the prospective purchaser must continue to exercise reasonable care to
protect himself, explaining that if a defect is so clearly apparent that the
buyer's own inspection should reveal the flaw, "the buyer's negligence
alone would be the proximate cause of any injury he suffered." 109
Concluding that real estate brokers have an affirmative duty to in-
spect property for the benefit of the purchaser, the court of appeal held
that Valley Realty breached that duty.l"° Therefore, the decision of the
trial court was affirmed.
IV. ANALYSIS
A. Critique of the Decision
In Easton v. Strassburger, the court's primary goal was to provide
the purchaser of residential property additional protection against buying
a defective home. The Easton court's holding, requiring the seller's bro-
ker to inspect property for the purchaser's benefit, will undoubtedly pro-
vide that protection. In that respect, the Easton decision is a positive
one. However, the court-imposed duty is unwarranted by the realities of
the transaction and fails to provide the protection necessary to prevent
loss. Despite the court's laudable goal, flaws in the opinion suggest that
the court adopted the duty to inspect merely as a means of insuring re-
covery under the particular facts of Easton.
The first problem with the Easton court's imposition of a duty to
inspect is that the cases which were relied upon as support for such a
duty are distinguishable. The court candidly admitted that the cited
cases dealt with broker fraud, not broker negligence.111 Nevertheless, the
Easton court relied heavily on those cases in imposing a negligence
standard.
The Easton court cited Lingsch v. Savage.1 2 and Cooper v. Jevne113
as support for the duty to inspect, reasoning that that obligation is "im-
108. Id., 199 Cal. Rptr. at 391 (emphasis in original).
109. Id., 199 Cal. Rptr. at 391 (emphasis in original). If the defect in the property is obvi-
ous, "as a matter of law a broker would not be negligent for failure to expressly disclose it, as
he could reasonably expect that the buyer's own inspection of the premises would reveal the
flaw." Id., 199 Cal. Rptr. at 391.
110. The breach occurred because the agents "did not request that the soil stability of the
property be tested" and they did not inform the purchasers "that there were potential soils
problems." Id. at 96, 199 Cal. Rptr. at 386.
111. Id. at 99, 199 Cal. Rptr. at 387.
112. 213 Cal. App. 2d 792, 29 Cal. Rptr. 201 (1963).
113. 56 Cal. App. 3d 860, 128 Cal. Rptr. 724 (1976).
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plicit" in the duty not to commit fraud.114 The court stated that the rule
articulated in Lingsch and Cooper "speaks not only to facts known by
the broker, but also and independently to facts that are accessible only to
him and his principal."115 The Lingsch and Cooper rule was interpreted
as requiring the broker to disclose a material defect either when he has
knowledge of the defect or when that fact is accessible only to the broker,
not to the purchaser.116
The Easton court's interpretation of the rule in Lingsch and Cooper
holds the broker liable, under a theory of constructive fraud, whenever a
defect is accessible only to the broker, regardless of the broker's actual
knowledge." 7 This interpretation provides two separate theories of bro-
ker liability, based on either actual or constructive fraud, and enabled the
court to logically "imply" a duty to inspect from the existing law." 8
However, the Easton court misinterpreted the Lingsch and Cooper
rule in implying a duty to inspect. The precise language used to articu-
late the rule in Lingsch and Cooper states that "where a real estate broker
.. .knows facts materially affecting the value. . . of property. . . and
these facts are known or accessible only to him and his principal. . . the
broker. . . is under a duty to disclose these facts to the buyer." 19 Inter-
preted literally, the rule requires that the broker have knowledge of the
material fact and that the fact be known by or accessible to only the
broker, not to the purchaser. The two requirements are conjunctive.
The accessibility requirement is not an independent means of imposing
liability, as suggested by the Easton court. There were no facts in either
case which indicate that accessibility alone is sufficient to impose liability
upon the broker.' Thus, Lingsch and Cooper stand solely for the prop-
114. 152 Cal. App. 3d at 99, 199 Cal. Rptr. at 388.
115. Id., 199 Cal. Rptr. at 388 (emphasis partially in original). Later in the opinion, the
court emphasized its interpretation that the rule defines two separate means of liability, stating
that the "duty to disclose. . . has application only where it is alleged that the broker either
had actual knowledge of the material facts in issue or that such facts were 'accessible only to
him and his principal.'" Id. at 103, 199 Cal. Rptr. at 390 (emphasis partially in original)
(quoting Cooper v. Jevne, 56 Cal. App. 3d 860, 866, 128 Cal. Rptr. 724, 727 (1976)).
116. Id. at 99, 199 Cal. Rptr. at 388. See infra note 122 and accompanying text.
117. Id. at 103, 199 Cal. Rptr. at 390.
118. It required only a small leap in logic for the court to imply a duty to inspect from a
constructive knowledge--constructive fraud rule. Holding the broker liable for not discover-
ing that which would have been discovered with a reasonably diligent inspection is the same as
holding the broker liable for something he did not actually know but could have discovered
(constructive knowledge).
119. Cooper v. Jevne, 56 Cal. App. 3d 860, 866, 128 Cal. Rptr. 724, 727 (1976) (emphasis
added); Lingsch v. Savage, 213 Cal. App. 2d 729, 735-36, 29 Cal. Rptr. 201, 205 (1963). For
complete text of the rule, as it was articulated in Cooper, see supra text accompanying note 68.
120. In Cooper, the purchasers alleged that the agents knew of the defects but that they did
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osition that the broker must disclose facts actually known. This view
leaves little room to interpret the rule as implicitly imposing a duty to
inspect.
The Easton court also relied on Brady v. Carman in reaching its
decision.121 Although admitting that Brady involved broker fraud as op-
posed to negligence, the court quoted language indicating that brokers
had an existing duty to inspect: The broker "'was obliged as a profes-
sional man to obtain information about the easement and make a full
disclosure of the burdens it imposed on the land.' "122 However, analysis
of the Brady case indicates that this language was quoted out of context.
In Brady, the broker made affirmative representations in response to the
purchaser's questions, and the court held that the agent committed fraud
by not verifying the truth of those statements.23 Thus, Brady stands for
the proposition that the duty to "obtain information" arises as a result of
a broker's representation, not as an independent obligation. 24 In con-
trast to the broker in Brady, Valley Realty's agents made no affirmations
or representations to Easton regarding the soil. Therefore, Brady offers
little support for the Easton court's statement that the duty to inspect,
independent of an affirmative act, is "reflected in the law." '25
The Easton court also cited Merrill v. Buck 26 as support for the
contention that "a real estate agent is clearly under a duty to exercise
reasonable care to protect those persons whom the agent is attempting to
induce into entering a real estate transaction for the purpose of earning a
not. The purchasers also alleged that they were "ill equipped in both experience and means to
discover these very serious building deficiencies." 56 Cal. App. 3d at 865, 128 Cal. Rptr. at
726. The material facts were known only by the broker and were accessible only to him.
Thus, both prongs of the test were fulfilled and liability ensued.
121. 152 Cal. App. 3d at 102, 199 Cal. Rptr. at 390 (discussing Brady, 179 Cal. App. 2d 63,
3 Cal. Rptr. 612 (1960)). See supra note 71 for a discussion of Brady.
122. Id. at 102, 199 Cal. Rptr. at 390 (emphasis in original) (citing Brady, 179 Cal. App. 2d
at 68.69, 3 Cal. Rptr. at 615). The Easton court stated that "[tihis implicit duty of all real
estate agents [to inspect the property which they sell]. . . is reflected in the law," and then
quoted Brady as an example of a case reflecting that duty. Id. at 102, 199 Cal. Rptr. at 390.
123. Brady, 179 Cal. App. 2d at 68-69, 3 Cal. Rptr. at 615-16.
124. In quoting Brady, the Easton court deleted the following language defining the prereq-
uisites to disclosure: "The inquiry having been made [by the purchaser], and the defendant
having undertaken to answer, he was obliged as a professional man to obtain information
. Brady, 179 Cal. App. 2d at 68, 3 Cal. Rptr. at 616 (emphasis added). The Easton court
emphasized Brady's discussion of real estate agents as professionals and their duty to obtain
information. 152 Cal. App. 3d at 102, 199 Cal. Rptr. at 390. However, the court ignored the
fact that the duty only arose subsequent to some affirmative act by the agent.
125. 152 Cal. App. 3d at 102, 199 Cal. Rptr. at 390.
126. 58 Cal. 2d 552, 375 P.2d 304, 25 Cal. Rptr. 456 (1962). See supra note 76 for a discus-
sion of Merrill.
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commission."' 127 However, the Merrill court emphasized that the duty of
due care arose from the voluntary relationship which the agent assumed
with the prospective tenant.128 In Easton, Valley Realty was admittedly
the seller's agent. There was no contractual relationship with Easton,
nor did Valley Realty assume a voluntary relationship with her.129 Also,
while the agent in Merrill had actual knowledge of the hazardous condi-
tion, 130 the agents in Easton possessed no such knowledge.' 3 ' Thus, the
reasons for which the Merrill court imposed a duty of due care on the
broker were not present in Easton.
Because the cited cases may be distinguished from the facts in Eas-
ton, the decision is not merely an extension of old law. Rather, by requir-
ing the seller's broker to inspect property for the benefit of the purchaser,
the court imposed a new duty.1 32 The court advanced several policy ar-
guments to justify the imposition of this novel duty. The court noted
127. 152 Cal. App. 3d at 98 n.2, 199 Cal. Rptr. at 387 n.2 (citing Merrill v. Buck, 58 Cal. 2d
552, 375 P.2d 304, 25 Cal. Rptr. 456 (1962)).
128. 58 Cal. 2d at 561, 375 P.2d at 310, 25 Cal. Rptr. at 462.
129. Unlike Merrill, where the broker showed the property to the renter, Valley Realty's
agents did not show property to Easton, nor did they have any other contact with her.
130. 58 Cal. 2d at 561, 375 P.2d at 310, 25 Cal. Rptr. at 462.
131. See supra note 31.
132. The Easton court, admitting that it was imposing a novel duty, altered long standing
fiduciary rules. In so doing, the court bypassed the lawmaking powers of the legislature. With
its superior fact-finding resources and the ability to weigh the effects of a particular course of
action, the legislative branch has the responsibility of enacting long range policy procedures.
See Moran v. Harris, 131 Cal. App. 3d 913, 921, 182 Cal. Rptr. 519, 523 (1982) ("[The court]
may not encroach upon the lawmaking branch of government in the guise of public policy
unless the challenged transaction is contrary to a statute or some well-established rule of
law.").
The California Legislature, in enacting § 10176 of the Business and Professions Code, did
not impose an affirmative duty to inspect property. Implicit in this legislative inaction was a
finding either that the realities of real estate transactions do not justify imposing that duty on
brokers, see infra notes 134-37 and accompanying text, or that the effects of such a duty would
be detrimental to the market. See infra notes 214-19 and accompanying text. Section 10176,
as enacted, requires disclosure of known defects under a policy of preventing fraud. Although
requiring the broker to discloseknown defects is contrary to the seller's position, public policy
warrants such disclosure. Thus, the legislature impliedly determined that preventing fraud
outweighs the broker-seller fiduciary relationship. However, the legislature has not spoken on
imposing a duty to inspect on the seller's broker. There has been no legislative finding that the
purchaser's need to know discoverable defects outweighs the broker's fiduciary relationship
with the seller. Therefore, the Easton court enacted its own public policy law at the expense of
the broker-seller agency relationship.
It should be noted that recently proposed legislation, see supra note 66, which deals with
the broker's duties to both seller and purchaser, does not require the broker to make an affirm-
ative investigation for the buyer's benefit. Although this legislation was proposed subsequent
to the Easton decision, Assemblyman Connelly defined the broker's duty to the purchaser
under the Lingsch and Cooper standard: "A duty to disclose all facts known to the agent
materially affecting the value or desirability of the property that are not known to, or within
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that the rules regulating broker conduct are enacted for the public's pro-
tection and that the new duty is commensurate with that goal.133 How-
ever, the policy arguments advanced by the Easton court are
problematic, as many of the assumptions underlying these arguments are
incorrect.
First, the court stated that the broker is often in the best position to
"obtain and provide the most reliable information on the property." 134
This is not always true. It is often more likely that the seller, who lives
on the property and is thus more familiar with it, will have superior
knowledge regarding material facts. 135 Accordingly, it is unreasonable to
conclude that the broker can provide more reliable information than the
seller. Although the Easton court correctly stated that the purchaser is
in the worst position to know material facts regarding the property,
136
this observation does not justify imposing the duty on the seller's bro-
ker,13 7 as he is not in a materially better position to know those facts.
A second concern implicit in the court's decision is that the broker
may be the only party with the financial ability to satisfy a judgment.
138
the diligent attention and observation of, the parties." A.B. 1125, Reg. Sess. (1985) (emphasis
added).
133. 152 Cal. App. 3d at 99-100, 199 Cal. Rptr. at 388.
134. Id. at 100, 199 Cal. Rptr. at 388.
135. See Bevins v. Ballard, 655 P.2d 757, 764 (Alaska 1982) (Connor, J., dissenting) ("[A]
broker often has little personal knowledge of the property which he offers for sale." Further,
"[s]ellers. .. are normally in the best position to know the facts [about their property].").
136. 152 Cal. App. 3d at 100, 199 Cal. Rptr. at 388 (citing Comment, supra note 10, at
1343).
137. The court's holding expressly states that the duty of disclosure is imposed on the agent
representing the seller. Id. at 102, 199 Cal. Rptr. at 390. One of the many questions remaining
after Easton is the effect of the decision on the cooperating broker. Arguably, because the
subagency theory makes the cooperating broker an agent of the seller, the cooperating broker
has the same affirmative duty to inspect as the seller's broker. Conversely, the lack of time that
the typical cooperating broker spends at the property, coupled with the lack of a confidential
relationship with the seller, makes it unrealistic to impose a duty of inspection on that broker.
One possible way to resolve this conflict is to divide any costs of inspection between the
brokers. See infra notes 180-82 and accompanying text for a discussion of the monetary bur-
den of inspection. This division would prevent the cooperating broker from receiving the
windfall benefit of having the seller's broker shoulder the entire cost of protecting the buyer,
who is theoretically the cooperating broker's client.
138. In Easton, of the five parties sued, only Valley Realty was solvent. See supra note 37.
See also Jacobson, Broker's Liability for Sale of Defective Homes-The Decline of Caveat
Emptor, 52 L.A.B.J. 346 (1977), where the author stated that:
The first person [the injured purchaser] will look to [for recovery of money] is
the seller. However, the seller has no doubt taken the money he has received...
and reinvested in another home . . . . The seller may also have relocated too far
away to comfortably be reached by legal process. This leaves the real estate broker as
the most likely target. Because the real estate broker is highly visible, continues to be
in business, and is easily reached by service of process, he often becomes the eventual
target of a lawsuit.
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In Easton, the sellers' intentional concealment of the soil defects caused
severe economic loss, but their insolvency prevented the purchaser from
recovering any money from them. Additionally, Valley Realty's agents
were not liable for fraud or misrepresentation, preventing Easton from
recovering under those traditional theories. 39 Imposing the duty to in-
spect in this particular case allowed the court to reach the broker's "deep
pocket" and provided the purchaser with an avenue for recovery. There-
fore, it appears that the court's concern for one purchaser's economic
welfare induced it to impose an industry-wide duty, with the underlying
reason simply being that the broker has the ability to pay.
The Easton court's third policy argument concerned the effects of a
contrary holding." The court correctly reasoned that if the broker is
liable only when he has actual knowledge of a material defect, a disincen-
tive to inspect properties would result.141 The "ostrich effect" produced
by such a holding would cause brokers to make minimal property inspec-
tions, thereby avoiding the acquisition of knowledge which would trigger
the duty to disclose. 42 However, this disincentive to inspect would not
produce the drastic results predicted by the court.
The court was concerned that "unscrupulous" and "incompetent"
brokers would receive a windfall if required to disclose only known de-
fects.143 However, the court did not discuss the fact that these brokers
would still be liable under the Brady rule."4 That rule requires the bro-
ker to obtain all available information regarding any representations he
makes to the purchaser to ensure the truthfulness and accuracy of such
representations.14 The Brady rule, combined with the Lingsch and
Cooper rule,146 prevents the broker from making an affirmative statement
regarding the property without knowledge of the statement's veracity.
Further, market realities prevent the unscrupulous or incompetent bro-
ker from remaining in business.47
Id. at 346.
139. See supra note 35 and accompanying text.
140. 152 Cal. App. 3d at 99-100, 199 Cal. Rptr. at 388. See also supra notes 88-89 and
accompanying text.
141. Id., 199 Cal. Rptr. at 388.
142. Id., 199 Cal. Rptr. at 388.
143. Id. at 100, 199 Cal. Rptr. at 388.
144. See supra notes 70-73 and 121-24 and accompanying text for facts and discussion of
Brady.
145. 179 Cal. App. 2d at 68, 3 Cal. Rptr. at 615.
146. See supra note 68 and accompanying text.
147. According to the Department of Real Estate's licensing statistics department, as of
January 2, 1985, there were a total of 289,924 agents and brokers licensed in California. The
abundance of brokers creates intense competition to maintain a profitable business. This com-
petition is an incentive to act with diligence and honesty. A broker with a negative reputation
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A final flaw in the court's opinion is its reliance on the National
Association of Realtors' (NAR) Code of Ethics as precedent for a duty to
inspect. 148 The court cited the 1978 edition of article nine of the code,
which requires the Realtor to discover adverse factors, and a hypotheti-
cal case explaining that code section. 49 The interpretive hypothetical
stated that the Realtor violated his duty to the purchaser by failing to
ascertain the absence of a sewer hookup. 0 The Easton court stated that
the hypothetical situation was analogous to the case at bench.5'  Thus,
the court found that because Realtors had imposed the duty to inspect on
themselves, the code supported a judicial imposition of that duty. 52
However, the Easton court failed to cite the most recent edition of
the code. In 1982, NAR amended the case interpretation which was
cited by the Easton court. 53 The amended interpretation limited the
duty to discover adverse facts to those which are a "matter of public
in the community will find it very difficult to successfully compete. As with other occupations,
the unscrupulous or incompetent broker will be forced out of the market if the public refuses
to do business with him. In addition, the broker's license may be revoked for particular acts of
dishonesty or incompetence, thereby ensuring his removal from business. See CAL. Bus. &
PROF. CODE §§ 10176-10177 (West Supp. 1985).
It should be noted that there was no moral culpability on the part of Valley Realty, as all
allegations of fraud and misrepresentation were dismissed. Nor was it claimed that Valley
Realty's agents were incompetent or ignorant. Additionally, the trial jury's finding that Valley
Realty was only five percent responsible for Easton's loss suggests that Valley Realty's actions
were not excessively unreasonable.
148. 152 Cal. App. 3d at 101-02, 199 Cal. Rptr. at 389-90. See supra notes 94-97 and
accompanying text for discussion of the code.
149. 152 Cal. App. 3d at 101-02 & n.6, 199 Cal. Rptr. at 389-90 & n.6.
150. See supra note 95 for text of hypothetical case interpreting article 9 of the code.
151. 152 Cal. App. 3d at 101-02 n.6, 199 Cal. Rptr. at 389-90 n.6.
152. Id., 199 Cal. Rptr. at 389-90 n.6. A Realtor may be sanctioned by NAR for violating a
code provision. H. MILLER & M. STARR, supra note 2, § 6:37, at 164-68. The code is also
properly used as evidence of the requisite standard of care owed by the broker. See Pepper v.
Underwood, 48 Cal. App. 3d 698, 714, 122 Cal. Rptr. 343, 355 (1975). By imposing a duty to
inspect based on the code, it appears that the court created a negligence cause of action for
breach of a code provision.
The Easton decision appears to transform the code into a negligence standard analagous
to the theory finding negligence for violation of a statute. Under the Easton court's reasoning,
violation of a code section raises a presumption that the broker breached his duty of due care
to the purchaser. If the violation caused injury to the purchaser, that presumption will be
sufficient to support a judgment against the broker. See generally 46 CAL. JUR. 3d, Negligence
§§ 92-110 at 278-305 (1978).
In view of the fact that the court used the wrong version of the code in deciding the case,
see infra notes 153-56 and accompanying text, use of the code to create a rebuttable presump-
tion of negligence would appear to be improper under the rationale posited by the Easton
court.
153. NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF REALTORS®, INTERPRETATIONS OF THE CODE OF ETH-
ics, Case #9-10 (8th ed. 1982) [hereinafter cited as INTERPRETATIONS II].
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record." '154 Contrary to the Easton court's assertion, Realtors do not im-
pose on themselves the duty to discover every adverse factor affecting
property. Rather, the duty to discover applies only to those factors of
which there is constructive notice.1 55 Consequently, the court used out-
dated material to impose on Realtors a mandatory rule which they had
declined to make mandatory upon themselves.156
B. Implications of the Decision
1. The broker's fiduciary duties after Easton
As a result of the Easton decision, the broker's fiduciary duties to
the seller are no longer clearly defined. The court imposed an affirmative
obligation on the listing broker to inspect property for the benefit of the
purchaser. However, this duty ignores the broker-seller fiduciary rela-
tionship established in the listing contract"5 7 and the obligations to the
seller which arise from that relationship.'5 8
As stated previously, the listing agent has the obligation to the seller
to sell property at the best possible price and terms, 59 and agency law
prohibits any action by the broker which is adverse to his principal's
interests.1"° The duty imposed by the Easton court requires the broker to
affirmatively act for the purchaser's benefit, despite the lack of an agency
relationship, thereby requiring the broker to act contrary to the seller's
interests. 161
This new duty is very different from the obligation previously im-
154. Id., Case #9-10 of INTERPRETATIONS II. Matters of record include conveyances,
easements, liens and any other document capable of being recorded and statutorily recognized
as providing constructive notice. See CAL. CIV. CODE § 1213 (West 1982). Thus, soil defects
would not be considered matters of record. See generally 55 CAL. JUR. 3d Records and Re-
cording Laws, §§ 37-43 at 159-73 (1980) and cases cited therein for discussion of recording and
constructive notice.
155. See supra note 154.
156. In amending the case hypothetical, NAR limited the duty to inspect to matters of
which there is constructive notice. This limitation eliminated the possibility of interpreting the
code as a standard for discovering all defects. The court's citation to the older code, however,
defeated NAR's attempt to limit their self-imposed obligation.
157. See supra note 40 and accompanying text.
158. See supra notes 44-47 and accompanying text.
159. See supra note 51 and accompanying text.
160. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 387 (1957) ("an agent is subject to a duty
to his principal to act solely for the benefit of the principal in all matters connected with his
agency") (emphasis added), and id. § 395 (agent cannot communicate information to others
"to the injury of the principal").
161. See Comment, supra note 10, at 1352: "The conclusion is inescapable that when the
broker is under a duty to disclose material defects to the buyer, it is at the expense of the duty
of loyalty to the seller."
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posed on the seller's broker, which only required the disclosure of known
defects. That duty is not adverse to the seller's interests, as the seller
himself must disclose known defects.162 Thus, the broker is merely being
held to the same standard as his principal. Also, while that duty is pre-
mised on a policy of preventing fraud, the duty imposed by the Easton
court does not depend on the broker's moral culpability.
The broker's fiduciary obligations to the purchaser remain as con-
fusing subsequent to Easton as they were before the decision. Prior to
Easton, no fiduciary duties were owed to the purchaser unless the broker
was found to be his agent.163 The only obligations owing to the pur-
chaser were to disclose known material facts and to refrain from fraudu-
lent acts.' 64 However, after Easton, the listing broker must act for the
purchaser's benefit. 165
The decision creates a difficult conflict of interest for the listing bro-
ker. He is required to act diligently for the seller's benefit because of the
established agency relationship. The broker is also required to act dili-
gently for the purchaser, despite the lack of an agency relationship. As
stated previously, it is exceedingly difficult for an agent to act with the
highest good faith to parties with adverse interests, yet this is the require-
ment imposed by the Easton court.'
66
Beyond the court's apparent disregard for established fiduciary law,
the Easton decision could ultimately result in the imposition of a strict
liability standard on brokers. In Bevins v. Ballard,167 the Alaska
Supreme Court found the seller's broker liable for innocent misrepresen-
tation.1 68 The dissenting justices argued that such a holding is akin to
imposing strict liability, making the broker "the insurer of the seller's
representation."1
69
162. See, e.g., Ashburn v. Miller, 161 Cal. App. 2d 71, 326 P.2d 229 (1958) (court held that
vendor, who knew that lot consisted of fill but represented to purchaser that land was solid,
was liable for fraud and misrepresentation).
163. See supra notes 53-57 and accompanying text.
164. See supra notes 68-73 and accompanying text.
165. The broker must undertake actions for the purchaser despite the fact that there is no
broker-purchaser relationship. For example, Valley Realty's agents did not have any contact
with Easton. See supra note 129.
166. See supra notes 61-62 and accompanying text.
167. 655 P.2d 757 (Alaska 1982). In Bevins, the court found that the brokers, who merely
conveyed to the purchasers representations made by the sellers, were liable for innocent mis-
representation. The court stated that brokers have no general duty to inspect, but that public
policy favors imposing liability whenever a misrepresentation is made, regardless of whether
the broker does so innocently.
168. Id.
169. Id. at 764 (Connor, J., dissenting). Justice Connor, joined by Justice Rabinowitz,
stated:
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The Easton court moves even closer to imposing strict liability than
did Bevins, since under Easton the broker need not make a representation
to the purchaser. Instead, the broker may be held liable, despite a dili-
gent inspection of the property, if he overlooks a defect which the jury in
hindsight believes should have been discovered. The broker is not merely
"insuring" the seller's representation. Rather, he is insuring, for the pur-
chaser's benefit, that the property will be free from defects.
2. Scope of the Easton duty
The Easton standard, requiring a "reasonably competent and dili-
gent" 170 inspection by the seller's broker, has created much uncertainty
for real estate brokers and has left many questions unanswered.
The first question concerns what the agent will be required to dis-
cover. The factual circumstances of Easton indicate that the "reasonable
broker" is required to possess a high level of expertise regarding the
structural qualities of residential property. 71 If the reasonable broker is
required to discover defects in soil compactness, he may also be required
to discover defects in the roofing, plumbing, heating and electrical sys-
tems.1 72 Although a broker should possess a general knowledge of typi-
When a realtor acts as a mere conduit for passing on information supplied by the
seller, he should be under no duty independently to verify that information unless he
has reason to believe the information to be false. Allowing an innocent misrepresen-
tation action against the broker in such circumstances is quite close to imposing strict
liability. There is no reason to make the broker the "insurer" of the seller's
representation.
IM. (citations omitted).
170. 152 Cal. App. 3d at 102, 199 Cal. Rptr. at 390.
171. In Easton, the material defect was that the house was constructed on improperly com-
pacted fill. Such a determination requires complicated and expensive tests beyond the exper-
tise of the ordinary broker. The court recognized that the problem was beyond the expertise of
the agents, stating that the agents should have requested further tests on the soil. Id. at 104-
05, 199 Cal. Rptr. at 391-92. Because the agents in Easton were found liable despite their lack
of expertise, the standard subsequent to Easton may require the "reasonable" broker to possess
expertise in many areas or face liability because of the lack of it.
172. The "reasonable broker" standard presumably requires that the broker in question
possess the same knowledge and expertise as the average broker in the same situation. How-
ever, real estate brokers are not required to possess any particular knowledge regarding soil
compactness. Among the courses required to obtain a broker's license are the legal aspects of
real estate, real estate practice, real estate appraisal and real estate financing. CAL. BUs. &
PROF. CODE § 10153.2 (West Supp. 1985). Additionally, the applicant must pass an examina-
tion administered by the Department of Real Estate. CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 10153 (West
Supp. 1985). Similarly, an applicant for renewal of his salesperson's license must complete
courses in ethics, legal aspects of real estate, real estate financing, consumer disclosures and
fair practices in real estate. CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE §§ 10170.4-10170.5 (West Supp. 1985).
It is important to note that in order for the broker or agent to obtain his license, he is not
required to complete courses in inspection of property, nor is he expected to have any particu-
lar expertise regarding defects in property. The courses which the broker is required to take
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cal problem areas, the duty to inspect may ultimately require expertise in
many diverse areas.173 Until future cases establish and define the limits
of the new duty, brokers will remain unsure of how much expertise is
necessary to escape liability.
Second, the Easton decision is unclear as to when the duty to inspect
will be triggered. In Easton, the court found that because the agents had
notice of certain problems, they should have taken additional steps to
determine the extent of those problems.174 However, in its precise state-
ment of the rule, the court did not limit the duty to inspect to facts of
which an agent has notice.'75 Thus, regardless of whether there are any
indications of potential problems, it appears that the agent must make a
diligent inspection of the property. 176
"do not deal with, and no one need know anything about, hidden defects in soil or structures,
or inspecting for them." Amicus Brief for the California Association of Realtors at 7-8, Easton
v. Strassburger, 152 Cal. App. 3d 90, 199 Cal. Rptr. 383 (1984) [hereinafter cited as Amicus
Brief for CAR, Easton].
Thus, because brokers are not required to have expertise in soil analysis, it appears that
the Valley Realty brokers were required to possess greater knowledge than that of the typical
broker. Similarly, the licensing requirements do not require particular expertise regarding the
roofing, plumbing, heating or electrical systems, nor of other structural components of the
house. Yet, after Easton, these may become part of the knowledge requirement of a "reason-
able broker."
The Easton court was concerned that the real estate broker "would be shielded by his
ignorance of that which he holds himself out to know." 152 Cal. App. 3d at 100, 199 Cal.
Rptr. at 388. The court stated that the real estate broker "holds himself out to the public as
having particular skills and knowledge in the real estate field." Id. at 103-04, 199 Cal. Rptr. at
391. However, real estate brokers usually do not hold themselves out as having any particular
skill or knowledge in soil engineering or structural fitness. The average broker holds himself
out as an expert "in bringing together buyers and sellers, in the mechanics of escrows and
transferring titles, possibly in financing. [He is] not [an expert] in building houses or testing
them or the soil on which they rest for defects." Amicus Brief for CAR at 8, Easton. The
broker who does hold himself out as an expert in structural matters would be governed by the
Brady rule. See supra notes 71-73 and accompanying text. Thus, the court's concern that a
broker will be shielded by his ignorance of that which he holds himself out to know is under-
mined by the realities of the real estate industry.
173. See supra notes 171-72. A broker who is required to be an expert in many diverse
areas will be forced to spend a great deal of money and time acquiring that knowledge. Also,
due to the many diverse structural components in a residence, it may be impossible for the
broker to acquire an expertise in all of them. See infra notes 210-19 and accompanying text for
discussion of a possible solution to the problem of requiring the broker to be an expert in
structural matters.
174. 152 Cal. App. 3d at 104, 199 Cal. Rptr. at 392.
175. Id. at 102, 199 Cal. Rptr. at 390 (Real estate brokers have the "affirmative duty to
conduct a reasonably competent and diligent inspection of the residential property listed for
sale and to disclose to prospective purchasers all facts materially affecting the value or desira-
bility of the property that such investigation would reveal.").
176. Logically, the duty to investigate should be limited to situations where a red flag is
present, because the agent would then have some indication that a problem existed.
Arguably, the court unnecessarily imposed the duty to inspect in deciding the case. A
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The third question concerns how the broker may satisfy the duty to
inspect. If the seller's broker does not perceive any red flags on the prop-
erty, will the duty to inspect be discharged, or is additional action re-
quired?17 7 If the broker asks the seller whether any problems exist with
the property and receives a negative answer, may he accept the answer at
face value or must he insist on further inspection? 7 ' If the broker dis-
covers a red flag during his inspection, may he satisfy the duty of disclo-
sure by pointing out the indicator to the purchaser and explaining its
potential ramifications, or must he order a complete inspection to pre-
cisely determine the extent of the problem?' 79 The courts must attempt
to answer these questions in future cases interpreting the Easton duty.
decision more limited in scope would have satisfied the court's goal of protecting the purchaser
while avoiding many of the problems generated by the duty to inspect.
The opinion specifically noted that the sellers' agents had knowledge of red flags regarding
the soil condition. 152 Cal. App. 3d at 96, 104, 199 Cal. Rptr. at 386, 391. Under the rule of
Lingsch and Cooper, requiring a broker to disclose known facts, the court could have imposed
liability on Valley Realty based solely on the agents' failure to disclose knowledge of the red
flags. Although the agents may have been unaware of the ramifications of these particular red
flags, the decision could have limited the duty to disclosing their existence. The definition of a
"material fact" could have been expanded to include a red flag, requiring only minimal depar-
ture from existing law. In this manner, Easton would have recovered her loss without impos-
ing the duty to inspect, making it unnecessary to depart from previous case law.
177. If the broker does not see any red flags in his walk-through, he will have no indication
where or how to begin a more thorough investigation. Some problems will not be discovered
by the broker unless there are red flags. The agent's ability to discover a defect on a walk-
through is dependent in large part on his expertise in structural systems. Thus, the issue be-
comes the level of expertise that courts will require the broker to possess. See supra notes 171-
72. After Easton, that level appears to be very high.
178. Requiring the broker to "discover" facts which are in all likelihood already known by
the sellers is a needless expenditure of the broker's time and efforts. If the seller knows of a
defect and fails to disclose its existence, he is liable for fraud under existing law. Ashbur v.
Miller, 161 Cal. App. 2d 71, 326 P.2d 229 (1958). The purchaser would therefore be protected
in such a situation. If the seller in good faith answers that the property has no defects, yet the
broker insists on ordering an inspection, the implication will be that the seller is lying. Thus,
requiring the broker to inspect despite his principal's answer will be detrimental to the fiduci-
ary relationship between the two parties. Additionally, if the seller never discovered any de-
fects while living in the house, and truthfully answers to that effect, it is highly improbable that
the broker would be able to discover any defects during his inspection.
179. The Easton court hinted that disclosing the existence of the red flags would have been
sufficient to avoid liability. See 152 Cal. App. 3d at 96, 199 Cal. Rptr. at 386 ("Despite [their
knowledge of the red flags], the agents did not . . .inform [the purchaser] that there were
potential soil problems."). Conversely, the court also stated that the agents should have re-
quested a soil report or taken other steps to determine the extent of the problems. Id. at 104,
199 Cal. Rptr. at 391.
The best resolution of this issue would be to allow the broker to discharge his duty simply
by disclosing the existence of red flags to the prospective purchaser. See supra note 176. As
the person merely bringing the buyer and seller together, the broker should not be required to
order tests and obtain expert opinions. That is an item properly negotiated between the
principals.
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Fourth, it is not clear which party must pay for the cost of inspec-
tions which are beyond the broker's expertise. In Easton, complicated
tests were necessary to determine the extent of the soil problems. The
court stated that the brokers should have ordered the tests, but did not
explain which party would be liable for the costs.1 80 After Easton, the
seller has no incentive to voluntarily pay these costs. If the seller is
aware of a problem and wants to prevent its discovery, he may not desire
any inspection. 181 Similarly, if the seller has not discovered any material
defects after living in his home for many years, he may not wish to pay
an inspector to verify what he already "knows." Because Easton makes
the broker liable for any defects which are not discovered, the seller has
no reason to pay for inspection costs. In fact, the seller may require the
broker to pay for an inspection as a condition of obtaining the listing,
knowing that the broker is not in a position to bargain over that
condition.
182
Finally, in future cases similar to Easton, the role of comparative
negligence is uncertain. The Easton court stated that, under the principle
of Li v. Yellow Cab Co.,' 83 a broker will not be held liable if the defect is
so "clearly apparent" that it should have been discovered by the
buyer.18 4 However, the court did not define "clearly apparent," stating
only that this determination was to be made as a "matter of law."' 85
Because the court characterized the typical residential purchaser as un-
wary and inexperienced,' 86 it is arguable that most defects will be found
to be beyond the perception of the typical purchaser.
180. See 152 Cal. App. 3d at 104, 199 Cal. Rptr. at 391.
181. The seller would, of course, be subject to liability for fraud in this situation. See, e.g.,
Ashburn v. Miller, 161 Cal. App. 2d 71, 326 P.2d 229 (1958) (seller may not knowingly make
false statements regarding condition of his property).
182. Because of the large number of brokers in California, see supra note 147, a broker may
be forced to accept the seller's terms or lose the listing to another broker. Also, the broker
who accepts a listing will be forced to pay for an inspection, knowing that if a defect surfaces
he will be liable for damages. Although Easton makes the broker liable only for damages
which could have been reasonably discovered, this standard does not offer much protection to
the broker. This is especially true in light of the complex facts which were found to be reason-
ably discoverable in Easton. See Amicus Brief for CAR at 4, Easton ("Hindsight being invari-
ably perfect, juries would regularly find that any problem learned for the first time after a sale,
would have been discovered by a 'reasonably competent and diligent inspection.' ").
183. 13 Cal. 3d 804, 532 P.2d 1226, 119 Cal. Rptr. 858 (1975) (court held that contributory
negligence would no longer bar recovery by the plaintiff, adopting instead comparative negli-
gence, which assesses liability in proportion to fault).
184. 152 Cal. App. 3d at 103, 199 Cal. Rptr. at 391.
185. Id., 199 Cal. Rptr. at 391.
186. Id. at 100, 199 Cal. Rptr. at 388.
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The Easton jury found no negligence on the part of Easton. 187 This
fact is puzzling, as she apparently was aware that the property was lo-
cated on fill soil."8' Because knowledge of the condition was not suffi-
cient to impose comparative negligence, the Easton duty implicitly
requires that the purchaser have both notice of the red flag and awareness
of its consequences. If this is the standard of comparative negligence
which future cases will apply, that standard will provide the broker with
very little protection.189
V. RESPONSE OF THE CALIFORNIA ASSOCIATION OF REALTORS
The California Association of Realtors (CAR) has expressed much
concern about the effect which Easton will have on the real estate indus-
try. The uncertainty caused by the decision, and the potential liability it
imposes on California brokers, has attracted much attention from CAR.
The organization filed an amicus curiae brief in Valley Realty's unsuc-
cessful appeal to the California Supreme Court and, subsequent to that
court's denial of a hearing, published a guidance memorandum to the
state's Realtors. 90
187. Id at 97, 199 Cal. Rptr. at 386. Because the judgment imposed 100% of the loss on
the defendants, the jury must have concluded that Easton was 0% at fault for the loss.
188. See Brief for Respondent at 12, Easton, where plaintiff admitted this knowledge:
"Even though Mr. Easton knew that the lot was cut and fill, he was not aware of the dangers
of fill." The Eastons were divorced prior to the lawsuit, but the husband's knowledge can
reasonably be imputed to his wife.
Additionally, the red flags were as equally visible and accessible to the purchasers as they
were to Valley Realty's agents.
189. The doctrine of comparative negligence will necessarily result in the broker's participa-
tion in a costly trial. The duty imposed in Easton allows a purchaser to state a cause of action
by alleging that the property contains a defect which the broker failed to discover. The broker
will be unable to successfully move for summary judgment, as liability under this duty is a
question of fact. The issues at trial will be the proximate cause of the injury and apportion-
ment of fault between the parties. 152 Cal. App. 3d at 103, 199 Cal. Rptr. at 391. Although
the Easton court stated that a purchaser's comparative fault could be determined as a matter of
law, this is a question of fact that must be decided at trial. Thus, the broker will be forced to
undertake a costly defense even in situations where, as in Easton, the purchasers had access to
the red flags and the broker was only minimally at fault.
The Easton court stated that the broker receives additional protection because he is enti-
tled to indemnification by the seller. Id. at 111-12, 199 Cal. Rptr. at 396-97. However, indem-
nification under these circumstances offers little real protection to the broker. Underlying the
court's decision to impose liability on the broker was the concern that the seller may be insol-
vent and unable to satisfy a judgment. See supra notes 13 8-39 and accompanying text. If this
is true, then the broker's ability to indemnify his loss is nonexistent. The broker, like the
purchaser, will be unable to recover money from an insolvent seller.
190. See Memorandum, California Association of Realtors®, The Easton Case: Further
Guidance for C.A.R. Members, (July 5, 1984) [hereinafter cited as Further Guidance]. For
complete text of Further Guidance, see Appendix.
Prior to the California Supreme Court's denial of a hearing, CAR published a temporary
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The CAR memorandum consists of questions and answers concern-
ing the effects of the decision. The guide describes a five-step approach
to "minimizing and possibly avoiding Easton liability." '191
First, CAR advises the broker to ask the seller if there are past or
existing problems with the property. These questions should be asked
when the broker takes the listing for the property. If the seller's response
indicates that there have been problems, the broker should determine
what steps, if any, were taken to remedy the situation. 192
The second step is for the broker to carefully inspect the property
for red flags. 193 Examples of red flags include water-stained ceilings, sag-
ging ceilings and peeling plaster, all of which would indicate roof
damage. 
194
Third, the broker should point out any red flag indicators to the
seller. 195 The broker should also inquire about the red flags to determine
their cause and whether the indicated conditions continue to exist.
19 6
Fourth, the broker should recommend that a professional inspector
be hired to investigate the problem.197 The inspector should be retained
to determine whether a defect actually exists and, if so, what it will cost
to repair.198
The final step is for the broker to disclose to the buyer the informa-
tion discovered by the inspector. 99 In the event that neither buyer nor
seller wishes to conduct the inspection, the broker should obtain a writ-
ten release stating that he advised that the inspection be conducted."z°
CAR admits that neither its suggested procedure, nor any other ap-
guide to assist the state's brokers in interpreting the Easton case. See Memorandum, Califor-
nia Association of Realtors®, The Easton Case: Interim Guidance for C.A.R. Members (April
11, 1984).
191. Further Guidance, supra note 190, at 5-7.
192. Id. If the seller confirms that there have been problems, questions to ask include the
date of repair, the seriousness of the problem, the extent of the repair and whether the repair is
under warranty. Id.
193. Id.
194. Id. See supra note 30 for a discussion of red flags.
195. Id. at 6.
196. Id.
197. Id.
198. Id. Once the broker discovers the red flags, CAR advises the broker to recommend
that either the buyer or seller engage an inspector to determine the extent of the problem.
199. Id. at 6-7.
200. Id. It is unclear whether the Easton duty may be satisfied by merely pointing out the
existence of red flags. See supra notes 176 & 179. The purchasers in Easton had knowledge of
the red flag indicators, but liability was imposed because the brokers did not investigate and
disclose the ramifications of these indicators.
The CAR memorandum further states that the broker will be unable to limit his liability
through the use of "as is" clauses or disclaimers. Further Guidance, supra note 190, at 4.
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proach, will "absolutely guarantee the avoidance of liability."20 1 At best,
these steps will minimize liability until further court decisions define the
precise requirements of the duty.20 2 Finally, included among CAR's fu-
ture plans to limit the impact of Easton is a proposal to investigate the
possibility of developing legislation to define guidelines for the duty to
inspect.
20 3
VI. AN ALTERNATIVE SOLUTION
After Easton, the costs of residential real estate transactions will un-
doubtedly increase. The primary cause for this increase will be higher
premiums charged to the broker for his errors and omissions insur-
ance. 2" The broker will also bear the financial burden of obtaining the
education necessary to adequately inspect the property he is attempting
to sell.205 Third, the broker will have to spend additional time at the
property in order to conduct a sufficiently thorough inspection. Finally,
should an expert be required, the broker will be forced to incur the costs
of hiring an inspector.2 °6
As a result of these increased costs, the broker will increase the com-
mission charged to the seller.207 This increase will enable the broker to
201. Further Guidance, supra note 190, at 3.
202. Id. The CAR Memorandum states:
The facts and circumstances in each case must be examined carefully to assess the
legal duty now required under the Easton decision. Therefore, it is incumbent upon
each licensee to carefully examine each set of facts and to consult with his or her own
attorney in those questionable situations ....
Id. The CAR Memorandum focuses on the issue of red flags. CAR believes that the broker's
duty should be limited to the discovery of these red flags, with an expert being consulted if any
such indicators are found. See supra note 198. In this way, the broker is not required to
possess any special expertise to fulfill the duty. Limiting the broker's duty in this manner
seems warranted by the realities of the transaction. See supra notes 176-77.
203. Further Guidance, supra note 190, at 7-8. Additionally, CAR plans to publish an Eas-
ton compliance manual with standard forms and checklists, develop a continuing education
program incorporating further developments of the duty to inspect, and offer legal advice to
brokers with specific factual questions. Id.
204. Errors and omissions policies have traditionally protected the broker against negli-
gence liability while excluding coverage for fraudulent or intentional acts. Because Easton
greatly expands the broker's potential negligence liability, there is a corresponding expansion
of the insurer's potential responsibility to indemnify that liability. Therefore, the insurance
companies will either increase the premiums charged on that coverage, in order to cover their
expanded potential losses, or discontinue writing errors and omissions policies altogether.
205. A real estate broker is not currently required to possess any specific knowledge regard-
ing structural analysis. See supra note 172. However, in effect, the Easton court found the
brokers liable for not possessing the expertise necessary to analyze soil defects. Therefore,
after Easton, brokers must obtain additional education in order to acquire that expertise.
206. See supra note 182 and accompanying text for reasons why the broker will be the party
who must incur the cost of inspection.
207. Prior to Easton, the typical commission rate was six percent of the sales price, paid
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maintain his profit margin while adequately providing the required serv-
ices. The seller will in turn raise the sales price of his home to compen-
sate for his increased cost. Therefore, the Easton duty will result in an
increase in residential home prices, with the ultimate financial burden
falling on the purchaser.2 °8
The purchaser will receive, at best, questionable protection in return
for the additional price he will pay for the home. Because the broker is
not an expert in structural analysis, °9 it is not certain that he will dis-
cover the defect and thus prevent any loss. Rather, Easton protects the
purchaser by providing a party to sue should the home prove defective.
Any alternative to the Easton duty must meet the court's concern
for protecting the residential home purchaser, but should do so with
greater efficiency. The alternative should provide protection which will
prevent the purchaser's loss, thereby justifying any increase in the prop-
erty's sales price. Additionally, the realities of real estate transactions
must be taken into account.
One possible alternative which affords the purchaser the additional
protection desired by the Easton court and recognizes the realities of real
estate transactions is the implementation of a system of state licensed
"home inspectors." 2' 0 These inspectors would be regulated by the state,
much like the termite inspectors currently utilized in many residential
transactions. 211 The home inspector, employed by the seller, would in-
from the proceeds at the close of escrow. It is not yet known how great an increase will be
necessary to cover the broker's additional costs.
The increased costs resulting after Easton will prevent individual real estate offices from
charging a reduced commission in order to attract bargain conscious sellers. All brokers are
required to make a diligent inspection, and are therefore forced to bear the costs arising from
that duty. Thus, the increase in commissions will be uniform throughout California.
208. In this respect, the duty to inspect acts as a forced negotiation between the seller and
the purchaser. The purpose of the new duty is to allow buyers to purchase a home without
hidden defects, or to at least provide them a means of recovery in the event that a defect later
surfaces. Prior to Easton, a purchaser who wanted this protection had to bargain with the
seller for a warranty insuring that there were no defects. Thus, the buyer's costs were in-
creased in return for additional protection. After Easton, the result is the same, but it occurs
in an indirect, non-negotiated manner.
209. See supra note 173 and accompanying text.
210. A similar system is currently being developed in Canada. See Nixon, Protection for the
Purchaser Against Defects in Used Housing: The Emerging Home Inspection Profession, 20 Os-
GOODE HALL L.J. 155 (1982). Canada's laws vary significantly from California's in regard to
the duties owed to the purchaser, making the rationale for home inspections in Canada differ-
ent than that proposed here. However, the logistics of the Canadian system could prove in-
formative in the adoption of an inspection system in California.
211. See CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE §§ 8500-8697.6 (West 1975), which describe the licens-
ing procedures and educational requirements for termite inspectors. The educational require-
ments and state regulatory scheme ensure that these inspectors will be experts in that field. A
similar system would ensure expertise in structural systems analysis.
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spect a property listed for sale and issue a "certificate of fitness," war-
ranting that no defects exist in the property.212
There are several advantages to such a system. First, these inspec-
tors would possess the specific expertise and knowledge necessary to
complete a thorough investigation of the property. Thus, the inspector
would discover hidden defects more readily than a broker. This arrange-
ment allows the broker to concentrate on activities at which he is an
expert-namely, the negotiation and supervision of the actual real estate
transaction. This alternative recognizes the fact that the broker is not a
"jack-of-all-trades" expert in the structural analysis of real estate, leaving
such analysis to persons specifically trained for the job.
Second, a "fitness certificate" issued by a state licensed inspector
would assure potential purchasers that the home is free of defects,
thereby increasing the saleability of the subject property. By making the
fitness certificate a condition of the escrow, the purchaser would receive
knowledge of a discovered defect before purchasing the house.213 Should
a defect be discovered, the seller could either repair the defect or lower
the sale price to reflect the property's value in its defective condition. In
either circumstance, the purchaser has the ability to bargain for the prop-
erty with complete knowledge of all relevant facts. He will no longer pay
the full price for property with a defect only to be forced into court to
recover his losses.
Third, if the inspector failed to locate a defect which was reasonably
discoverable, he would be liable for any loss. Although this liability ap-
pears very similar to that which Easton imposed on the broker, there is a
crucial distinction. The broker does not present himself to the public as
an expert in structural analysis nor, prior to Easton, did he undertake an
inspection for the benefit of the purchaser. Conversely, the state licensed
inspector would be an expert in structural analysis, and would present
212. Potential collusion between the seller and inspector could be prevented by requiring
the inspectors to be bonded. Section 8697 of the Business and Professions Code requires ter-
mite inspectors to post a bond in favor of the State of California for the benefit of any person
who is damaged by the fraud or dishonesty of the inspector.
213. The Easton decision provides the purchaser a party to sue should the home prove to be
defective. However, because the broker is not an expert in the home's structural systems, the
duty imposed does not improve the buyer's opportunity to learn of the defect before the home
is purchased. If the broker fails to discover the defect, the buyer's only recourse is to bring suit
after the fact. Although the purchaser may ultimately recover his damages, he did not bargain
for the inconvenience and emotional strain of a lawsuit. Additionally, as occurred in Easton,
the defect may prevent the buyer from the full use and enjoyment of his property. Conversely,
a licensed inspector, trained in structural systems analysis, is more likely to discover a defect
prior to the purchase. Thus, the purchaser will not be forced into court to enforce his rights
and will receive what he bargained for-namely, a home free from defects.
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himself to the public as such. Furthermore, as a paid employee, the in-
spector would be expected to exercise greater care than the seller's bro-
ker, who is not compensated for inspection services.
The costs of utilizing a home inspector would, in the long run, be
less than the costs which will result after Easton.2 14 Therefore, although
the seller may increase the property's selling price due to the cost of an
inspector, the increase to the purchaser would be less than the increase
resulting from the broker's costs after Easton. Moreover, that increase is
amply justified by the increased protection provided to the purchaser by
the inspector.
The purchaser protection provided by home inspectors could be
complimented by requiring the seller to provide the purchaser with a
home protection insurance policy. Home protection policies insure
against the failure of items such as the heating, plumbing and electrical
systems.215 These policies are relatively inexpensive and provide com-
plete coverage for the purchaser's first year of ownership.216 These poli-
cies do not protect against defects existing at the time of purchase, such
as the soil problems present in Easton. However, as a result of the fitness
certificate provided by the home inspector, the purchaser should have
knowledge of those defects. In addition, the rules prohibiting fraud
would provide additional protection against purchasing a home without
knowledge of existing defects.
By providing a home protection policy, the seller further enhances
214. The Easton decision will increase broker costs due to the broker's additional expendi-
tures in acquiring the necessary knowledge of structural systems, the additional time spent
making an adequate inspection, the cost of hiring an expert for investigations beyond the bro-
ker's knowledge, the large increase in premiums for errors and omissions insurance and the
cost of defending an anticipated increase in negligence lawsuits. To compensate for these in-
creased costs, the broker will charge the seller a higher commission rate, and the seller will in
turn raise the sales price of his home. See supra notes 204-08 and accompanying text.
Conversely, the costs of utilizing a system of licensed inspectors would be lower. Possess-
ing greater expertise, the inspectors would discover more defects, and consequently prevent
loss to the purchaser. Loss prevention would in turn eliminate subsequent litigation and its
attendant costs.
215. The Standard Plan insurance policy, issued by Ticor Home Warranty, Los Angeles,
California, covers the plumbing, heating and electrical system, water heater, built-in kitchen
appliances, dishwasher, garbage disposal, microwave oven, range and oven, trash compactor,
and hot water dispenser.
The No-Strings Comprehensive Plan, issued by American Home Shield, Dublin, Califor-
nia, offers a similar plan which covers everything insured by Ticor's Standard Plan, plus the air
conditioning and pool, and items such as shower enclosures, holding tanks, fixtures and air
filters.
216. Ticor's Standard Plan costs $295.00 for one year. For an additional $35.00, the central
air conditioning system is covered. Coverage for a swimming pool and spa is included for an
extra $110.00. American Home Shield's plan costs $395.00 for thirteen months.
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the home's desirability to prospective purchasers and decreases the possi-
bility of a future lawsuit. Additionally, the concern that a seller or bro-
ker will be insolvent, preventing recovery by an innocently injured
purchaser, is alleviated.217 Finally, the risk of loss is removed from the
broker, who receives no compensation to assume that risk. The insurer
assumes the risk of loss as part of its business and can reflect it in the
premiums charged to the public.
This proposed alternative constitutes a comprehensive protection
system for the purchaser.2 18 However, hypothetical situations can be
posed in which the defect would neither be discovered by the inspector
nor covered by the home protection policy. It is impossible to guarantee
that the buyer will never purchase a home with a defect. However, this
risk will be minimized by utilizing home inspectors combined with home
insurance policies.219 The purchaser will receive a benefit of definite
quality, as opposed to the unknown quality of the protection provided by
the Easton duty.
VII. CONCLUSION
In Easton v. Strassburger, the California Court of Appeal imposed
on real estate brokers the affirmative duty to inspect residential property
which they sell. The court enacted this duty to provide the purchaser
with substantial protection against purchasing a defective home.
Although protecting the unwary purchaser is a laudable objective,
the court failed to adopt the most efficient means of achieving that goal.
In imposing the duty to inspect, the court greatly expanded the broker's
obligation to the purchaser. Several factors indicate that this expansion
was unwarranted.
First, because the cases cited as supporting the decision are distin-
guishable, no precedent exists for imposing this duty. Second, the court
failed to recognize that the seller is in the best position to know of defects
and is the party benefitting most in the transaction. Thus, the seller,
rather than the broker, should bear the responsibility of inspection.
Third, the new duty ignores the fact that the broker is not an expert in
217. Unless the insurance company becomes insolvent, the purchaser is assured of recover-
ing money for any loss suffered.
218. The purchaser is protected against known defects by the rules prohibiting fraudulent
misrepresentations by the broker and seller; he is protected against defects in the property
which are discovered by the home inspector; and he is protected against defects occurring after
the purchase by the home protection policy.
219. If an expert could not discover the defect, and it took longer than one year to surface
(so that the home protection insurance policy expired), it is unreasonable to assume that a
broker inspecting the property would have had the ability to discover that defect.
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structural analysis and is ill-equipped to provide thorough and efficient
inspections. The duty will require the broker to become a "jack-of-all-
trades," preventing him from focusing his expertise on the sale transac-
tion. Fourth, the Easton duty will result in increased brokerage commis-
sions, primarily resulting from increased premiums for errors and
omissions insurance. This increase will be reflected in higher home
prices, but is not justified by the quality of protection provided. Finally,
the court ignored existing agency law, imposing on the seller's broker a
fiduciary obligation to the purchaser despite the lack of a relationship
between those parties. That obligation prevents the broker from fulfilling
his duty to the seller, and makes the broker a virtual insurer of the
purchaser.
The vagueness of the new standard and the resulting unanswered
questions indicate that imposing this novel duty was best left to the legis-
lature. A decision based primarily on social policy concerns should be
the responsibility of the branch of government best equipped to make
that decision. The courts lack the legislature's fact-finding capacity and
ability to fully consider all possible ramifications of imposing the new
duty. The Easton duty is shortsighted and will not prevent loss to the
purchaser, but will instead provide only a party which the purchaser can
sue after the loss occurs.
This Note has proposed the use of a system of state licensed inspec-
tors in conjunction with home protection insurance policies. The pro-
posed alternative provides more efficient protection for the purchaser
than the Easton duty. The inspector, as a trained expert in structural
analysis, will be better equipped than the broker to discover hidden de-
fects. Thus, the purchaser will learn of the defect prior to the purchase.
The proposed alternative places financial responsibility on the seller, the
party who receives the greatest benefit in the transaction. The benefits
accruing to the buyer justify the increase in the purchase price caused by
payment of the inspection and insurance fees. This alternative, however,
can be enacted only by the legislature. Until that time, Easton's duty of
inspection will be imposed on the seller's broker at a greater cost to all
the parties involved.
Jack B. Hicks III*
* The author has been a licensed California real estate agent since 1981.
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APPENDIX
MEMORANDUM
CALIFORNIA ASSOCIATION OF REALTORS®
EXECUTIVE OFFICIES 0 525 SOUTH VIRGIL AVENUE, LOS ANGELES, CALI-
FORNIA 90020 0 (213)739-8200
THE EASTON CASE: FURTHER GUIDANCE FOR C.A.R.
MEMBERS
July 5, 1984
Reprinted with permission of the publisher; copyright © 1984 by the California Association
of Realtors@ Legal Services Plan
On February 22, 1984, the California Court of Appeals decided the case
of Easton v. Strassburger. A petition for hearing was subsequently filed
in the California Supreme Court. On May 31, 1984, the California State
Supreme Court refused to hear the Easton case. Following their refusal
to hear it, the Easton case is now law in California and may be cited by
attorneys as authority in posing what is becoming known as "Easton"
liability.
On April 11, 1984, a set of Questions & Answers setting forth "Interim
Guidance" for C.A.R. members was distributed to all BOARDS OF
REALTORS® in California. The same Interim Guidance Question &
Answer series was also published in the June issue of the California Real
Estate magazine in the Legal Lines column.
The set of Questions & Answers which follow are designed to provide
further assistance in assessing "Easton" type liability and practical sug-
gestions to avoid such liability. Additionally, the Questions & Answers
contain possible approaches which will be pursued by C.A.R.
Question:
1. What are the facts in Easton v. Strassburger?
Answer:
The listing agents had a listing on a home built on fill that had not been
properly engineered and compacted. The owners did not disclose to the
agents or buyers past slide activity and the corrective action they had
taken. The buyers purchased unaware of any soils problems or the past
history of slides and subsequently suffered excessive damages.
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The evidence before the court indicated that:
* At least one of the listing agents knew the property was
built on fill ("red flag");
* The listing agents had seen netting ("red flag") on a slope
which had been placed there to repair the slide that had
occurred most recently prior to the sale;
• One of the listing agents testified that he had observed that
the floor of the guest house was not level ("red flag") while
the other agent testified that uneven floors were "red flag"
indicators of soils problems.
Question:
2. How did the court rule?
Answer:
The court held "... that the duty of a real estate broker representing
the seller, to disclose facts, . . includes the affirmative duty to conduct
a reasonably competent and diligent inspection of the residential prop-
erty listed for sale and to disclose to prospective purchasers all facts ma-
terially affecting the value or desirability of the property that such an
investigation would reveal."
Question:
3. How is the holding in the Easton case different from prior law?
Answer:
Prior to Easton, a real estate broker or agent representing the seller had
an obligation to disclose known material facts affecting the value or de-
sirability of the property offered for sale. Under Easton not only is the
broker obligated to disclose known material facts, but he is now obligated
to disclose "reasonably discoverable facts" (those which he should have
known) affecting the value or desirability of the property offered for sale.
Question:
4. What is a reasonably competent and diligent inspection?
Answer:
In Easton the court tells us that a reasonably diligent and competent
inspection of the property includes something ". . . more than a casual
visual inspection and a general inquiry of the owners". In order to deter-
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mine what in fact is required under this standard we must keep in mind
the facts of the Easton decision; the brokers were aware of the "red flags"
and did not make recommendations with respect to appropriate testing
to ascertain what problems may underlie the "red flags"; neither did they
inform the buyers that there were potential problems.
Question:
5. What is a red flag?
Answer:
A red flag is a readily observable "sign" (indicator) of a potential prob-
lem. Some examples of "red flags" are:
* Water stained ceilings
* Cracks in walls, ceilings and floors
* Obvious additions or modifications to the structure (e.g.,
converted garages, room additions, etc.)
• Others (the above is obviously not an all inclusive list of
what could be potential "red flags").
Brokers must be aware of the facts and circumstances (unique in each
case) concerning the property in question and follow their instincts in
pointing out all "red flags". Also, brokers should not hesitate to make
recommendations that buyers in such situations seek "professional"
assistance.
Question:
6. Once the broker is aware of the "red flag", i.e., following the "rea-
sonably competent and diligent inspection", what should the broker do?
Answer:
The broker should point out the "red flag" to his principal and not ven-
ture an opinion (in effect a guess if the broker lacks the expertise to ven-
ture such an opinion) as to what problem may underlie the "red flag".
By venturing such a "guess" the broker may be holding himself out as
having expertise that in fact he does not possess. To do so, would invite a
court to judge the broker by the standard of expertise so represented.
Note: It also goes without saying that all disclosures in any transactions
should be in writing to not only protect the broker involved but also to




7. Did the court limit its decision and rationale to listing brokers only?
Answer:
Not necessarily; although the facts of this case involved a listing broker
(the cooperating broker was not sued), the new duty of care created by
the court and its rationale would appear to be equally applicable to all
agents in a transaction whether acting as listing agents, subagents, or
buyer's agents (under contract to the buyer).
Question:
8. Is there one simple approach to completely avoiding Easton liability?
Answer:
No; although there are procedures which can be implemented to mini-
mize Easton liability, no one approach will absolutely guarantee the
avoidance of liability. The facts and circumstances in each case must be
examined carefully to assess the legal duty now required under the Eas-
ton decision. Therefore, it is incumbent upon each licensee to carefully
examine each set of facts and to consult with his or her own attorney in
those questionable situations, or to contact C.A.R.'s Legal Services Plan
for specific advice on a specific set of facts.
Question:
9. Is it possible to utilize a written DISCLAIMER to avoid Easton
liability?
Answer:
Generally no; in most cases negligence liability (the new standard created
by the Easton court) cannot be avoided by a disclaimer (a written state-
ment in which the broker states that he is not responsible or liable for his
acts or failures to act) of negligence.
Question:
10. Will a broker be relieved of liability under Easton if the broker pays
for a home inspection or a home inspection is otherwise obtained for the
property in question?
Answer:
Not necessarily; the Easton case does not specifically address this issue.
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The case does not suggest that a home inspection, in and of itself, satisfies
the new duty created by the court. Additionally, a broker should pro-
ceed conservatively in making a referral for a home inspection to avoid
any liability arising out of a less than honest, full and complete
inspection.
Note: Although some home inspectors are licensed contractors and may
hold other licenses, home inspectors are not required to be licensed under
California law. It, therefore, may be difficult in some instances to objec-
tively verify a provider's competence.
Question:
11. Can Easton liability be avoided by the use of an "as is" clause?
Answer:
Generally no; a provision in a contract for the sale of real property which
states that the property is being sold in its "present condition" or "as is"
is commonly used in REO (lender acquired property), probate, and other
situations. Although the clause does effectively limit the liability the
seller may have as far as warranting the condition of the property, it does
not relieve the seller or the broker from the duty to disclose known mate-
rial facts or those facts which "should be known" (Easton type liability
standard).
Question:
12. Does the Easton decision apply to all types of real property?
Answer:
No; in Easton the facts involved a personal residence. The court in Eas-
ton made it very clear that it was not expressing an opinion as to whether
a broker would be obligated to the same standard involving the sale of
commercial real estate. The court noted that a purchaser of commercial
real estate is likely to be more experienced and sophisticated in his deal-
ings in real estate.
From a preventive legal perspective, good business practice would dictate
adopting prudent practices regardless of the type of property involved.
Question:
13. What is a preventive legal approach to minimizing and possibly
avoiding Easton liability?
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Answer:
It would appear that Easton type liability can be minimized and possibly
avoided by following the guidelines (impliedly set forth) in the Easton
decision.
The Easton decision would appear to suggest the following five step ap-
proach as a liability avoidance procedure:
Step 1: INQUIRE
ASK THE SELLER IF THERE ARE ANY PROBLEMS ("RED
FLAGS")?
For example, the listing broker is in the process of writing up the listing
and asks the seller if there are any problems with the property. The
seller responds that the roof did leak, but has been repaired. Given this
representation by the seller, the broker should ask the following:
* When was the repair made?
* Where did the roof leak?
* How serious was the roof leak and how extensive were the
repairs?
* Is there a warranty, if so what are the terms of such
warranty?
* Any other questions deemed appropriate in light of all the
facts and circumstances.
Step 2: INSPECT
DOES THE BROKER SEE ANY PROBLEMS ("RED FLAGS")?
The listing broker has completed Step 1, and now with the seller goes on
a visual walk through inspection of the property. The listing broker must
conduct more than a casual visual inspection of the property and should
therefore carefully look for "red flags".
For example, in the course of the inspection the listing broker would be
looking for any problem areas and in light of the seller's mention of past
roof leaking would be specifically looking for water stained ceilings, peel-
ing plaster at the top of the walls, sagging ceilings, and any other indica-
tions of water damage to the premises. During the inspection the broker
notices stained ceilings and also comes upon what the broker believes to
be a room addition.
Step 3: POINT OUT
POINT OUT/DISCLOSE ANY PROBLEMS ("RED FLAGS")?
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Having completed Steps 1 and 2, the broker is now aware of "red flags",
e.g. the water-stained ceiling as well as what appears to be a room addi-
tion. The listing broker points out to the seller the water stained ceiling
(apparently already known to seller) and additionally questions the seller
concerning what the broker perceives to be a room addition. The listing
broker might ask the following questions:
0 Is the water-stained ceiling the result of past water damage
or is this stain unrelated to past leaks?
0 Does the roof still leak?
* Is the room addition built with a permit and to code?
* Who constructed the room addition?
* Any other question deemed appropriate in light of all the
facts and circumstances.
Step 4: RECOMMEND
ADVISE THE SELLER OR BUYER TO HAVE A [APPROPRIATE
"PROFESSIONAL" INSPECTOR i.e., roofing inspector; general contrac-
tor, etc.] COME OUT TO INSPECT.
Following Steps 1, 2, and 3 the listing broker would recommend to the
seller that a roof inspector and perhaps a general contractor come out to
the property to inspect the roof to assure that it does not leak and to
inspect the room addition to assure that the room addition is in fact built
to code and with required permits.
Additionally, if the seller has informed the listing broker that the room
addition has been built to code and with permits the broker would be
well advised to check with the local planning department to ascertain
whether required permits were obtained and whether the city "signed
off" on the completed construction.
Step 5: DISCLOSE
DISCLOSE THE APPROPRIATE INFORMATION TO BUYER
AND SELLER, E.G.:
* [INSPECTOR] FOUND [SPECIFIC PROBLEMS].
For example, "the roofing inspector found that the roof still leaks" above
the area where the water-stained ceiling appears. Additionally, the gen-
eral contractor found that the "room addition was built with permits and
to code and has no problems."
* THE PARTY OR PARTIES DID NOT WANT TO
CONDUCT AN INSPECTION AND ARE AWARE OF
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THE RECOMMENDATIONS MADE BY THE BRO-
KER FOR SUCH AN INSPECTION TO DISCOVER
ADVERSE FACTORS.
For example, if in fact the seller or buyer did not want to conduct an
inspection to ascertain whether any continuing problems exist with the
roof, nor did they want a general contractor to advise them concerning
the room addition, the broker should confirm in writing that the parties
did not want to conduct an inspection, and are aware of the recommen-
dations made by the broker for such inspections as necessary to discover
adverse factors.
* THE INSPECTION REPORT IS ATTACHED OR
PROVIDED AS PART OF THE AGREEMENT BE-
TWEEN THE PARTIES.
In a situation where the inspection report or reports have been completed
by the appropriate "professional" they should be attached and made a
part of the agreement between the parties. This can be done initially
when the deposit receipt is offered to the seller if in fact seller already has
such reports completed; or can be tendered subsequently in escrow after
buyer purchases the property "contingent upon such investigative re-
ports being completed."
Note: The foregoing example is offered from the prospective of the list-
ing broker. The same analysis and 5 step approach can be utilized by the
selling broker with slight modification.
Steps 1 & 2 become reversed so in effect the selling broker would first
"inspect" the property (generally done when the property is shown to the
buyer) and as Step 2 would inquire of the seller or listing broker as to
whether any problems (or "red flags") exist. Steps 3 through 5 would be
completed as set forth above with the appropriate disclosures and recom-
mendations being made to the principal buyer as opposed to the seller.
Question:
14. What does C.A.R. plan to do to minimize and/or limit the impact
of the Easton decision?
Answer:
C.A.R. will do the following:
* Be sensitive to potential and actual litigation concerning
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Easton-type issues and consider possible test cases to be
funded by the Legal Action Fund.
* Investigate the possibility of developing legislation which,
among other things, may provide a more precisely defined
set of guidelines which would not only be more practicable,
but easier to implement.
• Investigate the possibility of developing an Easton-Compli-
ance Manual in conjunction with standard forms for disclo-
sure and possibly buyer/seller checklists.
• Develop a Continuing Education program which could in-
corporate materials from the Easton-Compliance Manual.
Additionally, the educational program would include Legal
Services Plan Outreach presentations as well as Continuing
Education courses.
* As legislation or further case legal developments clarify the
Easton rule, continue to develop further questions and an-
swers to keep members abreast of Easton-type liability is-
sues and preventive legal avoidance techniques.
" Encourage members with specific factual situations to con-
tact C.A.R.'s Legal Services Plan for preventive legal
counseling.
Question:
15. In summary-what is the recommended 5 Step Easton liability
avoidance procedure?
Answer:
" INQUIRE
* INSPECT
* POINT OUT
" RECOMMEND
* DISCLOSE
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